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DECEPTIVE POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 
Laurie Magid* 
I. INTRODUCTION: FOCUSING ON VOLUNTARINESS 
TO LIMIT THE USE OF DECEPTION 
Virtually all interrogations - or at least virtually all successful in­
terrogations - involve some deception.1 As the United States 
Supreme Court has placed few limits on the use of deception, the vari­
ety of deceptive techniques is limited chiefly by the ingenuity of the 
interrogator. Interrogators still rely on the classic "Mutt and Jeff," or 
"good cop, bad cop," routine. Interrogators tell suspects that non­
existent eyewitnesses have identified them, or that still at-large ac­
complices have given statements against them. Interrogators have 
been known to put an unsophisticated suspect's hand on a fancy, new 
photocopy machine and tell him that the "Truth Machine" will know if 
he is lying. Occasionally, an interrogator will create a piece of evi­
dence, such as a lab report purporting to link the suspect's bodily flu­
ids to the victim. Perhaps most often, interrogators lie to create a rap­
port with a suspect. Interrogators who feel utter revulsion toward 
suspects accused of horrible crimes sometimes speak in a kindly, solici­
tous tone, professing to feel sympathy and compassion for the suspect 
and to feel that the victim, even if a child, should share the blame. At 
the very least, the successful interrogator deceives the suspect by al­
lowing the suspect to believe that it somehow will be in the suspect's 
best interest to undertake the almost always self-defeating course of 
confessing. 
* Special Assistant District Attorney, Delaware County, PA; Commissioner, 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing; Lecturer, Villanova Law School. B.S. 1982, 
Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1985, Columbia Law School. 
In writing this Article, I benefited greatly from discussing drafts with Benjamin 
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Louis Sirico, and Welsh White. My research assistants, Timothy Bowers, Ipek Kurul, 
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Article. 
1. As referred to by commentators seeking to limit the use of deceptive interrogation 
techniques, deception is defined broadly to include everything from express misstatements 
about the existence of evidence, to the use of false expressions of sympathy for a suspect in 
order to establish a better rapport. 
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Because most deception is employed only after the suspect exe­
cutes a valid waiver of Miranda2 rights, Miranda offers suspects little 
protection from deceptive interrogation techniques. Thus, commenta­
tors have increasingly looked to the volllntariness requirement of the 
Due Process Clause as a basis for limiting these techniques. These 
commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the voluntari­
ness requirement - such as equality, dignity, and trust - to justify 
limiting the use of deception. On close scrutiny, however, none of 
these rationales provides a sound basis for prohibiting or drastically 
limiting the use of deception during interrogation. Presumably in rec­
ognition of the fact that these rationales have somewhat limited reso­
nance with the Court, with legislators, and with the public at large, 
some commentators have now focused on the reliability rationale for 
the voluntariness requirement. A confession is unreliable when the 
person who gives it actually had nothing to do with the crime to which 
he purports to confess. 
Commentators have sought to show that deception causes many 
false confessions and, thus, the wrongful convictions of many innocent 
persons.3 Their efforts have captured the attention not only of the 
academic community, but also of the popular press.4 Television, news­
papers, and magazines have reported on individual cases in which de­
fendants were convicted after giving purportedly false confessions,5 
and on the academic studies calling for limits on the use of deception 
during interrogation.6 Scholars of law and psychology have made sug-
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. As discussed in this literature, a false confession does not include a statement making 
even a partial admission to actual wrongdoing. A false confession consists only of an admis ­
sion to wrongdoing by an entirely innocent person. 
4. See Alan W. Scheflin, Book Review, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1998) 
(reviewing CRIMINAL DETECTION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME (David W. Canter & 
Laurence J. Alison, eds., 1997)) (finding that the "field of false confessions is currently a 
'hot' topic"). 
5. See James R. Peterson, True Confession?, PLAYBOY, July 1, 1999, at 45, available at 
1999 WL 7387978 (collecting cases of allegedly false confessions); ABC News: 20120 (ABC 
television broadcast, June 18, 1999), available at 1999 WL 6790763 (reporting on the confes ­
sion of twelve-year-old Anthony Harris to murdering his five-year-old neighbor, and the 
confession of fifteen-year-old Michael Crowe to murdering his younger sister); CBS News: 
48 Hours (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 13, 2000) , available at 2000 WL 8422806 (reporting 
on two teenagers who confessed to murdering four girls in Austin) [hereinafter 48 Hours]; 60 
Minutes (CBS television broadcast, June 30, 1996) (reporting on the case of Richard 
LaPointe's allegedly false confession to murder). 
6. See, e.g. , Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have 
Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at A l  (reporting on Leo and Ofshe's study); Thomas 
H. Maugh II, Glendale Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 
1998, at A l  (same); Mary McCarty & Tom Beyerlein, Coming Back to Life After Hell, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 4, 1985, at lA, available at 1995 WL 8952484 (reporting on man 
released from death row and referring to the Bedau & Radelet study); Clarence Page, When 
a Death Sentence is Dead Wrong, CINCINNATI POST, July 11,  1996, at 19A, available at 1996 
WL 10557685 (reporting on four men freed from prison and the report by Bedau and 
Radelet); Peterson, supra note 5, at 45 (reporting on Leo and Ofshe study of sixty false con -
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gestions for curtailing deceptive interrogation techniques.7 While some 
commentators have concluded that few limits on deception techniques 
are necessary,8 and a few have advocated prohibiting any interrogation 
techniques involving deception,9 still others have proposed limits be­
tween these two extremes. 10 
fessions); 48 Hours, supra note 5 (reporting that Dr. Ofshe has analyzed sixty cases of police­
induced false confessions). 
7. See Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief 
Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1997) ("In the law 
reviews and psychological journals, one can read a veritable stream of new ideas for re­
stricting - or even eliminating - police interrogation.") [hereinafter Cassell, Balanced 
Approaches]. 
8. See, e.g. , Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A  Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 16, 20 (1961) ("Although both 'fair' and 'unfair' interrogation practices are 
permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the subject that will be apt to make an innocent 
person confess.") [hereinafter Inbau, Police Interrogation]; Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, 
Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 777 (1997) (taking 
a fairly expansive view on the use of deception by asserting that deceptive practices should 
be permitted once there has been a judicial determination of probable cause); Joseph D.  
Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern 
Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 690 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)) (concluding that "tactics that 
are likely to induce a false confession" are unacceptable) [hereinafter Grano, Selling the 
Idea]. 
9. See Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 3, 9, 44 
(1996) (advocating the prohibition of any lies during questioning) [hereinafter Paris, Trust]; 
Daniel W. Sasaki, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and Confessions, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 1593, 1612 (1988) (advocating a per se rule against police trickery during interroga­
tion); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
425, 477 (1996) (urging a complete ban on police lying in order to maintain trust relation­
ships between citizens and the police); Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True Blue? 
Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1994). 
Some commentators have sought to limit not only deceptive interrogation, but also any 
interrogation of suspects in the absence of counsel. See Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. 
Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
69 (1989); see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xvii (1932) (pro­
posing a bar on all interrogation by the police); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police 
Interrogation - And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 726 (1988) (arguing for a bar on all confessions obtained during custo­
dial interrogation); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A 
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (urging that interro­
gation be permitted only in the presence of counsel); Young, supra at 473-76 (arguing that 
confessions are seldom necessary, especially if obtained by deception). 
10. The most detailed intermediate proposal comes from Professor Welsh White. He 
argues "that interrogation methods likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions should be 
prohibited." Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against 
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111  (1997) [hereinafter White, 
False Confessions]. He advocates substantial limits on deception by proposing, first, that the 
police be prohibited from falsely leading a suspect "into believing that forensic evidence es­
tablishes his guilt," id. at 149, and, second, that courts closely scrutinize tactics that mislead 
the suspect "as to the strength of the evidence against him (or the likelihood of his guilt)," 
id. See also id. at 142-43 (suggesting that courts should restrict interrogation of "vulnerable 
suspects" such as juveniles and mentally impaired persons). This two-part proposal is far 
more limited than his 1979 proposal, in which he contended that "the device of seeking to 
elicit incriminating information through the assumption of a non-adversarial role should be 
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In order to evaluate these calls for either bans or significant limits 
on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques, I begin by briefly 
summarizing the history of the voluntariness requirement to identify 
its primary policy of preventing unreliable confessions. Next, I critique 
the rationales for the voluntariness requirement, other than reliability, 
that have been offered as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation. 
After concluding that none of these other rationales offers an appro­
priate basis for the limits, I examine the reliability rationale for the 
voluntariness requirement, and I find that it does provide the appro­
priate basis for setting appropriate limits on deceptive interrogation 
techniques. I then consider the evidence that reliability has been im­
plicated by the purportedly widespread problem with police-induced 
false confessions. Finding that the evidence of such false confessions 
consists entirely of anecdotal accounts, I conclude that the existing 
evidence falls well short of establishing the significant problem that 
barred." Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 581, 
617 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery). 
Professor Albert Alschuler has made suggestions similar to those of Professor White. He 
acknowledges that "[i]n some circumstances, [the police) should be allowed to express false 
sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, play on the suspect's religious feelings, reveal 
incriminating evidence that in fact exists, confront the suspect with inconsistent statements, 
and more." Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957, 973 
(1997) [hereinafter Alschuler, Constraint]; see also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege 
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2669 (1996) 
(proposing that police interrogation be replaced with questioning by a neutral magistrate). 
But he insists that, in addition to barring threats or promises, courts "should forbid falsifying 
incriminating evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect." 
Alschuler, Constraint, supra at 974. 
Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, the authors of a widely-cited article on false 
confessions, suggest a different approach. They do not advocate direct limits on the use of 
interrogation techniques involving deception. Instead, they first suggest that interrogations 
be videotaped. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: 
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U.  L. REV. 979, 1 120 (1997) ("To further 
improve interrogation practices and the truth-finding function of the criminal justice system, 
mandatory taping of interrogations should be adopted.") [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Decision 
to Confess Falsely]. They then suggest that judges evaluate the reliability of a confession be­
fore admitting it as evidence at trial. See id. at 1118. They would have judges determine reli­
ability by considering whether the defendant's "post-confession narrative" and the other 
evidence in the case corroborate the confession. Such evaluations are objectionable, how­
ever, because they would intrude on the traditional role of the factfinder. Judges do not 
evaluate other types of evidence - such as witness identifications - to determine whether 
the evidence is corroborated by other evidence. There is no reason to impose a corrobora­
tion requirement on statement evidence. See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": 
An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confessions, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 526 (1999) (criticizing the corroboration requirement) 
[hereinafter Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent"). Even if the use of deception were shown to cre­
ate a false confession problem, the proposed pre-trial evaluation of all confessions would not 
be the appropriate means of remedying the problem. See Welsh S. White, What is an 
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2025-26 (1998) (criticizing Leo's 
reliability requirement as both unworkable and insufficiently protective) [hereinafter White, . 
Involuntary Confession]. 
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has been alleged to exist.1 1 On the other hand, greatly limiting decep­
tion would impose significant costs on society in terms of reduced 
numbers of true confessions and reduced convictions of guilty persons. 
There is absolutely no question that the conviction of an innocent 
person because of a false confession is an enormous failing of the 
criminal justice system. But it does matter whether such occurrences 
are rare tragedies or a widespread epidemic. Statistically sound stud­
ies, based on a random sample of confessions to determine how many 
are false, can and should be done. At this point, however, given the 
absence of empirical support, the calls for fundamentally changing the 
way crime is investigated in this country are not justified. 
II. DEFINING VOLUNTARINESS 
A. The Multi-Factor Totality of the Circumstances Test 
The common law originally placed no limits on the methods used 
to obtain confessions.12 During the 1700s and 1800s, however, judges in 
both Great Britain and the United States became increasingly con­
cerned about the reliability of statements obtained by physically abu­
sive means and began to ask whether confessions were voluntarily 
given. 13 For example, in its 1884 Hopt v. Utah decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court suggested that abusive interrogation tactics might re­
but "the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions), 
namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or preju­
dice his interests by an untrue statement."14 
Nevertheless, law enforcement personnel continued to employ the 
"third degree" during interrogation. In 1936, however, with Brown v. 
Mississippi,15 the Court turned to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for examining the voluntariness 
of confessions in dozens of state cases.16 The Court held that police use 
of violence was "revolting to the sense of justice,"17 stating that " [t)he 
11 .  Thus far, there has been "advocacy research," but not objective "academic re­
search," on the issue of how frequently false confessions occur. See generally Victor L. 
Streib, Academic Research and Advocacy Research, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253 (1988). 
12. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at 442 (2d ed. 1999). 
13. See id. § 6.2, at 440 ("[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or 
by the torture of fear" would be excluded because it "comes in so questionable a shape when 
it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it." (quoting 
The King v. Warickshall, 1 68 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783))). ' 
14. 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). 
15 .  297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936). 
16. See Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2203 
("Due Process doctrine for police interrogations began its life with the Court's dramatic 
creation of a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule in Brown v. Mississippi . . . .  "). 
17. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
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rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness 
stand."18 In Brown and other early cases, the Court clearly believed 
that innocent persons had been convicted, and that their confessions 
were unreliable.19 Due process required interrogation procedures that 
would yield voluntary, and therefore reliable, statements. Courts used 
a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine whether "the 
interrogation was . . .  unreasonable or shocking, or if the accused 
clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational or intelligent 
choice. "20 
The totality of the circumstances test required courts to consider: 
the conduct and actions of the officers; the physical surroundings of 
the interrogation; and the characteristics and status of the defendant, 
including both physical and mental condition.21 Some types of police 
conduct were deemed so coercive that no examination of the particu­
lar susceptibilities of the suspect was even necessary.22 Most notably, 
physical violence and threats, whether implicit23 or explicit, could not 
be directed against any suspect.24 Physical mistreatment,25 such as ex­
tended periods of interrogation without intervals for sleep, also pro­
vided grounds for finding involuntariness.26 
The Court's pre-Miranda cases regularly looked to the characteris­
tics of the particular defendant in deciding whether a confession 
should be deemed involuntary.27 When the suspect was a juvenile, 
mentally ill, retarded, or intoxicated, courts required the police to 
lessen the intensity and duration of the interrogation or reduce the 
amount of deception. In other cases, however, the courts provided lit-
18. Id. at 285-86. 
19. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (defendant threatened with mob vio­
lence); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (defendant interrogated for five days with 
no contact with anyone except the police); White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940) (defendant 
taken into the woods on six nights for interrogation). 
20. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 661 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dis­
senting). 
21. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2(c), at 448. 
22. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (stating that, when the police con­
duct is outrageous, "there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the indi­
vidual victim"). 
23. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (defendant was kept naked for three 
hours, then left in his socks and underwear with a blanket for several more hours). 
24. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503 (1963) (slapping); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (whipping). 
25. See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1961) (deprivation of food or water). 
26. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) 
(thirty-six hours of interrogation). 
27. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (stating, in a case in which a fifteen­
year-old African-American defendant was arrested for murder and questioned from mid­
night to 5:00 a.m. by relays of officers, "[t]hat which would leave a man cold and unim­
pressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens."). 
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tle guidance to police regarding which social, emotional, or mental 
characteristics were relevant in determining how to interrogate a par­
ticular suspect.28 
Even though reliability was surely uppermost in the Court's mind 
when it decided Brown v. Mississippi, the Court gave mixed and con­
fusing signals in subsequent cases about the precise rationale for the 
voluntariness requirement.29 For example, in Jackson v. Denno,30 the 
Court referred to a "complex of values" requiring the exclusion of in­
voluntary confessions. Reliability was just one of these values. Yet, 
notwithstanding the Court's assertions that there are rationales other 
than reliability for the voluntariness requirement, reliability still ap­
pears to be the single most important factor considered by the Court 
in deciding whether a confession is voluntary.31 
B.  Courts Place Few Limits on the Use of Deception 
During an Interrogation 
Interrogation typically requires at least some deception - from 
professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the 
strength of the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a 
witness has identified the suspect.32 In the pre-Miranda voluntariness 
28. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court found that police miscon­
duct was an absolute prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness. Thus, the vulnerabilities of 
a particular defendant could never alone establish involuntariness. 
29. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 112-13 (discussing Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1 961)). In Rogers, the Court said that the issue was not reliability 
but "whether the behavior of the State's Jaw enforcement officials was such as to overbear 
[defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined - a ques­
tion to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [defendant] in fact spoke the 
truth." Rogers, 365 U.S. at 542, 544. 
30. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
31. See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND POLICY 20-21 (1980) (during the 1960s, "in 99 cases out of 100," a confession's volun­
tariness would be determined on the basis of whether the " interrogation methods em­
ployed . . .  create[d] a substantial risk that a person subjected to them will falsely confess -
whether or not this particular defendant did." (emphasis omitted)); White, False Confes­
sions, supra note 10, at 1 13 ("[I]t still appeared that the probable trustworthiness of a confes­
sion would be an important factor in determining its admissibility under the due process vol­
untariness test."). 
32. The seminal work on the various types of deception that the police employ during 
interrogation is contained in the police manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986). 
In Professor Leo's "typology of interrogatory deception," he catalogues the most fre­
quently used interrogation techniques. See Richard A. Leo & Jerome H. Skolnick, The Eth­
ics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5-7 (1992). He included: (1) pre­
senting interrogations as noncustodial interviews not subject to Miranda; (2) giving the 
Miranda warnings in a way calculated to downplay their importance; (3) misrepresenting the 
nature or seriousness of the offense; (4) assuming roles to make manipulative appeals io 
conscience; (5) misrepresenting the moral seriousness of the offense; (6) using vague and 
indefinite promises; (7) misrepresenting police identity; and (8) fabricating evidence. 
Professor Leo's description of deceptive tactics is quite similar to that of the Miranda Court. 
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cases, the Court characterized the use of deception during interroga­
tion as just one of the many factors it considered in evaluating the to­
tality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. For example, in 
Spano v. New York,33 an officer, who was also a close friend of the de­
fendant, told the defendant that he would get in a lot of trouble if the 
defendant did not confess. The Court found that the use of the defen­
dant's childhood friend, who feigned legal and family difficulties to get 
the defendant to confess, was unconstitutional. Although the Court 
held that the defendant's statement was involuntary, the use of decep­
tion was not a dispositive factor.34 In addition to the exploitation of the 
friendship, the Court's holding relied on the defendant's limited edu­
cation, his emotional instability, his great fatigue, the pressure used by 
the interrogating officers over many hours, his requests for an attor­
ney, and his requests to remain silent.35 
Although the Miranda Court appeared to take a negative view of 
deceptive interrogation techniques, the Court imposed few limits on 
their use. By detailed reference to police training manuals, the Court 
took note of widely used techniques, such as "good cop, bad cop" rou­
tines and false lineup identification techniques, and observed that the 
techniques created or increased the disadvantage most suspects had in 
matching wits with their interrogators.36 Instead of forbidding such 
techniques, however, the Court protected suspects by requiring that 
police inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and to be pro­
vided with an attorney before commencing custodial interrogation.37 
Miranda was the high-water mark of the Court's negative view of in­
terrogation in general and deceptive interrogation in particular.38 Since 
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. 
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962) (cataloguing various psy­
chological interrogation techniques)); see also White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 602-
28 (describing various types of deception used by police during interrogation). 
33. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
34. The Court stated that it deserved mentioning, in the totality of the circumstances 
inquiry, that one of the officers who questioned the defendant was a childhood friend, who 
falsely represented to the defendant that he would be in trouble if the defendant did not con­
fess. Id. at 323. 
35. See id. at 321-23 (noting that the cumulation of these factors amounted to "official 
pressure" that overwhelmed the defendant's will). 
36. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-58 (listing various types of police deception and ob­
serving that they could take a "heavy toll on individual liberty"). 
37. Miranda does limit the use of deception in obtaining a waiver of rights or in re­
sponding to requests to invoke the rights. Once the police obtain a valid waiver, however, 
and absent any express invocations of the right to silence or counsel, Miranda leaves the po­
lice free to use almost any deceptive tactic. 
38. When the Court recently reaffirmed the Miranda procedures, in Dickerson v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), the Court did not reaffirm the Miranda Court's arguably nega­
tive view of confessions. Where the Miranda decision is full of great passion and rhetoric, 
much of it aimed at the most common interrogation procedures, the Dickerson opinion is 
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then, the Court's decisions have reflected a far more positive attitude 
toward police interrogation and the role of confessions in the criminal 
justice system. 
The Court has directly considered the propriety of deception only 
once. In Frazier v. Cupp,39 the police misrepresented the strength of 
their case against the defendant. They falsely told the defendant that 
his cousin, who had been with him on the night of the crime, had con­
fessed.40 The Court considered the fact of this deception relevant to, 
but not dispositive of, the voluntariness issue. The Court has repeat­
edly declined the opportunity to place any specific limits on the use of 
deception during interrogation.41 
In 1986, while considering lies made to an attorney, the Court, in 
Moran v. Burbine, did acknowledge that some police deception might 
be so "egregious" that it could rise to the "level of a due process viola­
tion."42 Yet the Court neither provided examples of such unacceptable 
police conduct, nor suggested that the police needed to be particularly 
careful about using deception during interrogation. Instead, the 
Moran Court emphasized that society has a "legitimate and substantial 
interest in securing admissions of guilt,"43 and that " 'the need for po­
lice questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws' 
cannot be doubted."44 Similarly, in Illinois v. Perkins,45 the Court 
spare and subdued. Looking primarily to the principle of stare decisis to reaffirm Miranda, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist includes no criticism of specific police techniques. 
39. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
40. Id. at 737. The police also falsely claimed to have sympathy for the defendant. See id. 
at 738. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1017 (1990); People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 
(1990); State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153 (S.C. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1 129 (1997); State 
v. Milburn, 511 S.E.2d 828 (W. Va. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832 (1999). Moreover, in 
several cases that the Court heard on other issues, deception had been used during interro­
gation, and the Court made no unfavorable comment about the deception. See, e.g. , Illinois 
v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298 (1990) (holding that undercover officer posing as defendant's 
fellow inmate was not required to give Miranda warnings); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 
195, 198, 203 (1989) (affirming conviction where police told defendant that they had no way 
of giving him a lawyer, but that one could be appointed for him when he went to court); 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that the police need not disclose all 
possible areas of questioning before an interrogation); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
493-96 (1977) (per curiam) (finding that the police falsely told the defendant that they had 
found his fingerprints at the scene, but deeming the falsehood irrelevant for Miranda pur­
poses); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) 
(confessing suspect had been told that another person had named him as the gunman). 
42. 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986). 
43. Id. at 427. 
44. Id. at 426 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). The Court 
has recognized that "[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely 'desirable,' they are essential 
to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the 
law." Id. at 426 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977)); see also 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) ("[T]he ready ability to obtain uncoerced con­
fessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good . . . .  "). 
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noted that "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic decep­
tion . . . .  Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of se­
curity that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak 
are not within Miranda's concems."46 Thus, the "current constitutional 
doctrine ... by and large, has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanc­
tioned, police deception during the investigative phase. "47 The lower 
federal courts and state courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's 
decisions to find that almost no type of deception renders a confession 
per se involuntary.48 
C. Court's Rationales for the Voluntariness Requirement 
Although the Court has never set forth the precise rationale for 
the voluntariness requirement,49 the reliability concern provides the 
45. 496 U.S. 292 (1990). 
46. Id. at 297. 
47. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 777; see also Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. 
L. REV. 817, 818 ("(C]onstitutional law permits courts little room to impose meaningful re­
strictions on police lying . . . .  ") (hereinafter Paris, Lying]; Paris', Trust, supra note 9, at 6 
("[A]lthough interrogation in the United States is replete with formal rules and powerful 
informal customs, it is remarkably unconstrained by strong rules prohibiting interrogators 
from obtaining confessions by lies or trickery."). 
48. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 781 ("The message to the police is that, as far as the law is 
concerned, they have virtual carte blanche to engage in deceptive undercover work."); 
Young, supra note 9, at 451 ("With no absolute prohibition of police lying during interroga­
tion, courts today are free to condone such lying."). 
Courts are tolerant of lies about the existence of evidence. See, e.g. , Arthur v. 
Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that defendant's confes­
sion was voluntary, even though the police fabricated fingerprint and DNA reports). But see 
State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the police could not 
fabricate a lab report linking the suspect to the victim). The police may also lie about the 
strength of the government's case, see id. § 6.9(c), at 587-90 (citing cases); Holland v. 
McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) (police told the defendant a witness saw 
him with the rape victim); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1087-89 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(police told the defendant that her accomplice had given a statement against her); United 
States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1988) (police told defendant that the codefen­
dant had confessed); Commonwealth v. Jones, 322 A.2d 1 19, 126 (Pa. 1974) (police told the 
suspect that the co-defendant had given a statement against him); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930, 936 (Utah 1998) (police told the defendant that his co-defendants had implicated him in 
robberies); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2, at 447 (collecting cases). Courts look with 
somewhat more disfavor on lies about the law that will apply to defendant. See LAFAVE ET 
AL., supra, § 6.2, at 447. 
49. In some instances, the Court has resorted to vague language such as whether a de­
fendant's "will was overborne" during interrogation. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 
680, 685 (1993) (considering claim that repeated promises of lenient treatment had over­
borne defendant's will); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (concluding that 
threat of physical violence had overborne defendant's will); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 
303 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 325 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (listing factors courts 
consider in determining if "a defendant's will was overborne"). The Court has also referred 
to an individual's "autonomy" and "dignity" as concerns implicated by the voluntariness re­
quirement. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 703 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Allen v. Illinois, 478 
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most consistent, and appropriate, explanation for the Court's volun­
tariness decisions.50 The reliability rationale requires the Court to con­
sider whether the procedure by which a confession was obtained pro­
duces an unacceptably high risk that even an innocent person would 
confess to a crime if that procedure were used.51 State court decisions, 
perhaps even more than the Court's own decisions, have focused on 
the reliability rationale for the voluntariness inquiry.52 The Court's 
rhetoric in some cases does suggest that there is certain conduct that 
will not be tolerated as fair and just in a civilized society, even if it may 
result in reliable confessions.53 Yet, in most instances, the best predic­
tor of what will be deemed unacceptable is still the reliability princi­
ple. Although a particular confession may be reliable in fact, interro­
gation practices used to obtain that confession may be deemed 
unacceptable because there is a significant likelihood that the practices 
could produce unreliable confessions in other cases. Thus, the general 
U.S. 364, 383 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) 
(Brennan J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 423 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dis­
senting). 
50. Reliability was certainly a concern of the Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936), where the conviction was based solely on confessions procured by brutal whippings. 
In its post-Brown cases, the Court has, on a number of occasions, referred to the reliability 
concern. See, e.g. , Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 
(1942) (stating that the police actions made the defendant "willing to make any statement 
that the officers wanted him to make"); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940) (excluding 
confession obtained after a Texas Ranger repeatedly took defendant into the woods at night 
and whipped him); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
51 .  In considering the reliability rationale for the due process voluntariness require­
ment, a court does not ask whether a confession should be deemed reliable given all of the 
evidence in the case, other than the confession. Instead, a court must ask whether a govern­
ment procedure, such as the use of a particular form of deception, generally creates an un­
due risk that an innocent person will falsely confess. See White, Involuntary Confession, su­
pra note 10, at 2022 ("[T)he Court's Due Process confession cases have always focused on 
the propriety of the officers' interrogation methods rather than the resulting confessions."). 
52. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2, at 456-59. 
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (stating that confessions ob­
tained through coercion are contrary to "the 'strongly felt attitude of our society that impor­
tant human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government . . .  wrings a confession 
out of an accused against his will'" (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 
(1960))). The Court has appeared to characterize some police methods, conduct, or behav­
ior, as so offensive or improper, that they are barred even if the reliability of the resulting 
confession does not appear to be in question. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-55 
(1949) (involving a series of lengthy interrogations that occurred over seven days); Haley v. 
Ohio; 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-56 (1944) (involving 36 
hours of continuous questioning). The Court has called various police methods unfair, see, 
e.g. , Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219-236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of due pro­
cess is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in 
the use of evidence . . . .  "); outrageous, illegal, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 
(1959) (confessions are excluded as involuntary because of "the deep-rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law"); or contrary to fundamental values, see 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Coerced confessions offend the commu­
nity's sense of fair play and decency."). 
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statements about which police behavior will not be tolerated in a fair 
system, often still reflect, at bottom, a concern with reliability.54 
Ill. PROPOSED REASONS, BEYOND RELIABILITY, 
FOR LIMITING DECEPTION 
Some of the proposed limits on deceptive interrogation are based 
on rationales for the voluntariness requirement other than reliability. 
To evaluate the worth of the proposed limits, it is necessary to con­
sider the asserted rationales. 
A. Equality Between Suspect and Interrogator: 
"Fox-Hunter" Rationale 
The "fox-hunter,'' "fair chance,'' or "sporting theory" rationale for 
limiting police deception during interrogation provides that deception 
gives the interrogator so much of an advantage that the suspect has no 
real chance to avoid confessing.55 The argument is that the suspect is 
entitled to some assistance in resisting the powerfully persuasive ap­
peals of the interrogator to confess. The notion of creating some parity 
between the suspect and his interrogator was evident in Miranda's 
treatment of suspects as victims.56 References to the sporting theory 
54. In his seminal 1963 article on the Court's involuntary confession cases, Professor 
Yale Kamisar described the cases as decided based on two reliability standards. The first 
standard considered whether the confession of the particular defendant, given that defen­
dant's individual characteristics, might be unreliable. The second standard considers whether 
the police tactic might make some innocent defendant confess, even if there was no concern 
about the reliability of the instant confession. See Yale Kamisar, What Is an 
Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 755 (1963). A tactic that would never cause an inno­
cent person to confess falsely will rarely be deemed by the Court so outrageous as to be con­
stitutionally barred. 
55. Under this theory: 
The fox is to have a fair chance for his life: he must have (so close is the analogy) what is 
called law: leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a 
chance for escape. While under pursuit, he must not be shot: it would be as unfair as con­
victing him of burglary on a hen-roost, in five minutes' time, in a court of conscience. 
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 29 (1993) (hereinafter 
GRANO, CONFESSIONS] (citing J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk. 9, pt. 
4, ch. 3 at 238-39 (1827)). "Bentham sarcastically observed that this concern about the ac­
cused's likelihood of success at trial can be rational° only under a sporting code that has 
amusement rather than justice at its end." Id; see also William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination 
and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1234 n.22 (1988). 
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (acknowledging historically unjust 
methods for interrogating suspects); Joseph D. Grano, Criminal Procedure: Moving From 
the Accused as Victim to the Accused as Responsible Party, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 
713 (1996) ("Miranda . . .  expressed concern about the inequality between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated defendants . . . .  ") (hereinafter Grano, Criminal Procedure]; see also Andrew 
L. Frey, Modern Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 731, 
733-34 (1981) (stating that defendant, because of reliable confession, has no chance of ac­
quittal is "wholly desirable"). 
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are even more pronounced, however, in the work of commentators 
critical of police interrogation.57 
The sporting view or fox-hunter rationale for limiting deception 
should be rejected. It is not in society's interest to give the suspect and 
the officer an equal chance to prevail in an interrogation. Society is 
not indifferent as to who wins the hunt.58 There is no reason, constitu­
tional or otherwise, that guilty defendants deserve an opportunity to 
avoid prosecution or conviction.59 Interrogation is not a game in which 
a suspect matches wits with the police. Law enforcement should be 
encouraged to build the strongest possible case against a defendant, 
and one of law enforcement's goals is to solve a crime by obtaining a 
confession from the wrongdoer. Moreover, other types of evidence are 
not excluded or limited simply because they make conviction more 
likely. For example, DNA, fingerprint, and videotape evidence can be 
even more damning than a confession. Yet no one suggests that by 
collecting such evidence and introducing it at trial the police create 
some unfair inequality between the police and the defendant. Nor do 
we suggest that such powerful evidence makes a trial futile for the de­
fendant because it creates such a strong case for the prosecution. The 
community benefits when a case is strong, and when a guilty defen­
dant either pleads guilty or is convicted by being found guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
B.  Equality Among Suspects: The Equal Protection Rationale 
The "equal protection" rationale for limiting interrogation ad­
dresses the purported problem that some criminals are smarter, more 
sophisticated, or more able to resist the pleas of interrogators to con­
fess than are other criminals. Stated in a favorable light, the equal pro­
tection rationale means only that all suspects should be equally aware 
57. Professor George Dix, one of the leading proponents of the sporting view of interro­
gation, has concluded that "[a] major objective of the law of confessions . . .  should be re­
garded as assuring that a person who confesses does so with as complete an understanding of 
his tactical position as possible." George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, 
and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 330-31 (1975); see also Edwin D. 
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 61 (1968) 
("[E]ffective measures to right the imbalance created by the 'inherently coercive' atmo­
sphere might be no less than tantamount to the abolition of the institution."). 
58. See Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1443 (1985). 
59. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 32 ("What earned the fair chance ar­
gument Bentham's derisive fox-hunter's label was its suggestion that, as an end in itself, even 
guilty defendants should have a fair chance for acquittal."); George C. Thomas III, An 
Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 812 (1995) ("Noth­
ing - not even the tired cliche that the United States has an accusatorial and not an inquisi­
torial system of justice - will make [the fox-hunter] argument work once it is exposed as a 
call to give guilty suspects a better chance at acquittal." (reviewing GRANO, supra)). 
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of their rights.6() But when this rationale is viewed more expansively, it 
means that foolish, ignorant, and unsophisticated suspects must be 
given the same chance as experienced, knowledgeable suspects to re­
sist interrogation.61 
Proponents of the equal protection rationale have stated that it is 
"unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out and take 
advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a ci�izen."62 Such a 
view may have some validity when applied to truly mentally impaired 
individuals. But if psychological vulnerabilities are meant to include 
anything that makes a person more likely to confess - from a moder­
ately low I.Q. to a docile personality - than the propriety of interro­
gating almost any suspect is doubtful. Although the Due Process 
Clause may require some additional protections for particularly young 
or impaired suspects, it surely does not protect the foolish and unso­
phisticated criminal from himself. In fact, society benefits because 
some suspects confess.63 
Because Miranda guarantees that all suspects are aware of their 
rights, there is no need to further equalize suspects' ability or inclina­
tion to invoke those rights and prevent interrogations. There is no 
doubt that a foolish or unsophisticated suspect is far more likely to 
confess than is a strong, smart, sophisticated suspect. But this logical 
occurrence should not be troubling. The foolish suspect is also more 
likely to consent to a search, to leave fingerprints and other clues at 
the crime scene, to be slow or noisy, or to speak loosely to new ac­
quaintances who may be undercover officers. The community is 
pleased when any of these things happen because the criminal is more 
likely to be caught. Therefore, we should not be troubled when the 
suspect's folly leads him to confess when questioned. 
60. See Caplan, supra note 58, at 1456 ("Suspects who do not know their rights, or do 
not assert them, as a consequence of some handicap - poverty, lack of education, emotional 
instability - should not, it is felt, fare worse than more accomplished suspects who know 
and have the capacity to assert their rights."). 
61. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as A Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 15, 41 (1981) (noting that deceptive interrogation tactics "work unevenly by 
undermining the inexperienced and ignorant [while] having little effect on the hardened 
criminal."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 872 
(1981) (stating under the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, the "vulnerable were more likely 
to be on the losing end of a successful police interrogation" (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, 
POLICE lNTERROGA TION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980)) ). 
62. Schulhofer, supra note 61 , at 872. 
63. Thomas, supra note 59, at 812 (noting that calls for equal treatment in the interroga­
tion room "is like saying that because the police do not solve white-collar crimes as often as 
crimes of violence, the State should release from custody some of the robbers and mug­
gers"). 
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C. Trust Rationale 
Some commentators have urged limits on deceptive interrogation 
techniques in order to "facilitate trust relationships between suspects 
and government [interrogators] ."64 In fact, one commentator has ar­
gued that the primary purpose of interrogation is not to solve crimes, 
but rather to establish the interrogator's integrity and to elicit the sus­
pect's trust.65 Interrogation is not, however, a civics lesson for criminal 
suspects.66 Interrogation is a critical information-gathering tool in law 
enforcement's arsenal for solving crimes and protecting the public. 
Arguments based on the trust rationale ignore the chief purpose of in­
terrogation and the practical realities of law enforcement. Moreover, 
the trust rationale would require a ban on all undercover investigation. 
The basis of the trust rationale is that harm occurs when the suspect 
learns that the police lied to him during interrogation. Yet the suspect 
in an undercover operation will be similarly harmed by learning that 
an undercover agent's very identity was a lie. 
There is no real support for the claim that suspects would be more 
likely to confess to an officer whom they trusted.67 In addition, sus­
pects do not expect complete honesty from law enforcement person­
nel. Complete honesty would require an officer to inform a suspect 
that it is most certainly not in the suspect's best interest to confess and 
that the suspect would be best served by invoking his rights to silence 
and counsel.68 
64. Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6, 62 (1995) (noting that the lack of rules restricting lies 
creates an atmosphere in which the government is expected to lie and manipulate); see also 
Young, supra note 9, at 457-61; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 41 (interrogation about "gar­
den variety crimes, such as petty theft and income tax evasion, [results in] an unhealthy at­
mosphere of resentment and distrust"). 
65. Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 (asserting that an important police objective of 
interrogation is to "provide important opportunities for police to distribute information to 
suspects (and more indirectly, the public) about such things as integrity, honest dialogue, and 
trustworthiness"); Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 65 (asserting that "we might sensibly con­
clude that facilitating trust between individuals and their governments . . .  is an important 
goal to which the truth-seeking function sometimes must submit."). 
66. See, e.g., Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6 ("[W]e should want to make interrogation a 
particularly meaningful encounter for the suspect - one in which the values of trust and 
trustworthiness are taught by the interrogator's own example - regardless of whether a con­
fession ensues . . . .  "); see also Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 70 ("[W]hat is proper behavior 
between government and residents will closely resemble what is proper behavior in analo­
gous relationships among private individuals . . . .  "). 
67. Young, supra note 9, at 455-68. 
68. Professor Paris contends that suspects who are lied to and then convicted will re­
member the lie when they are released, be resentful about it, and be less likely to act as up­
standing citizens. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 830-31 .  Yet suspects who are not lied to 
may very well not confess, not be convicted, and will suffer no incarceration or other penalty 
for their wrong-doing. This unpunished, at-large criminal is certainly no more likely to be an 
upstanding citizen because he was not lied to by the police. Although he may have feelings 
of trust for the honest officers, he is just as likely to feel contempt towards them for their 
inability to apprehend and prosecute him for his wrong-doing. 
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According to the trust rationale, breaches of trust ultimately deter 
confessions because the resentful "suspect or defendant today may be 
the witness tomorrow."69 There is no evidence, however, that wit­
nesses have refused to talk to the police because the police are not al­
ways truthful in talking to suspects. Witnesses have many reasons not 
to cooperate with the police. For example, witnesses may be unwilling 
to make court appearances for fear that a defendant will retaliate. In 
addition, most people are already aware, if only from television, that 
the police lie during interrogation. There has been no showing that 
citizens have responded to this police ingenuity by declining to report 
crimes, assist in investigations, or testify as witnesses. Even if it were 
true that breaches of trust deterred confessions in the long-run, the 
police may legitimately feel that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush." When the police suspect a person of a particular, already­
committed crime, it is not worth forgoing deception, on the off-chance 
that the suspect might be a useful witness to some other person's fu­
ture crime. 
D. Dignity Rationale 
In advocating limits on police interrogation, some commentators 
refer to a concern for the individual's "dignity."70 According to these 
commentators, "pressuring a suspect to answer questions is unduly 
cruel, violating the idea of the basic dignity of all individuals,"71 and 
"[i]nterrogation tactics that are calculated to make the suspect feel 
that he is not a decent or honorable person unless he confesses consti­
tute direct assaults upon [his] dignity."72 The dignity concern would 
appear to invalidate most interrogation. Both commentators for73 and 
against74 substantial limits on interrogation refer to a need to respect 
individual dignity. Nevertheless, acknowledgement of this need does 
not translate easily into rules that distinguish acceptable and unac­
ceptable interrogation practices. 
69. Young, supra note 9, at 458. 
70. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 40-41 (arguing that deceiving suspects does 
not accord with dignity and autonomy). 
71 .  Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 48 n.153; see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 
9, at 76-77 (asserting that Miranda "reflects the ages-old tension between preservation of 
human dignity and solution of crimes."); Thomas S. Schrock et al., lnterrogational Rights: 
Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 42 n.174 (1978) (citing Miranda's as­
sumption that the constitutional basis of the privilege is the "respect a government . . .  must 
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens"). 
72. White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 628 (stating that "criminal suspects have a 
right to be treated in a manner that reflects a concern of their dignity as human beings"). 
73. See, e.g., id. at 627-28; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 51 (suggesting that police inter­
rogation be replaced with questioning by a magistrate). 
74. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 22 ("[N]otions of human dignity pro­
vide limits on what government may do to solve crime."). 
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E. Morality Rationale 
Some commentators have asserted moral limits on interrogation 
techniques.75 In particular, a number of these commentators76 have 
taken cues from the work of moral philosopher Sissela Bok. Bok has 
examined the justifications for lying throughout the whole range of 
human interactions.77 She details the harms that lying can cause, but 
concludes that lying is morally justified when there is no alternative, or 
when the lie results in greater benefits than costs.78 Thus, Bok finds 
that lying to one's "enemies" is justified. She does not specifically deal 
with the matter of interrogation, but she does allow that criminals 
could be considered "enemies."79 
Reliance on morality as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation 
practices requires two assumptions: 1) that lying and deception are 
clearly an evil within the everyday relationships of citizens; and, 2) 
that expectations about everyday relationships should also apply dur­
ing the questioning of criminal suspects. Both of these assumptions 
should be questioned. First, even apart from police questioning, in the 
normal course of affairs among citizens, deception cannot be painted 
as an unmitigated evil. In fact, deceptions large and small are an ac-
75. See, e.g. , Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 17 (concluding that the right to silence is 
"morally justified"). But see State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250-51 (N.J. 1968) ("It is con­
sonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity 
in the detectional process. This must be so if Government is to succeed in its primary mission 
to protect the first right of the individual to live free from criminal attack."). 
76. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 819; Slobogin, supra note 8, at 777 (confirming 
that his article principally relies on Sissela Bok's philosophical work); Robert P. Mosteller, 
Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833, 833 
(1997) ("I interpret Bok's approval of deception as further removed from authorizing the 
deceptive investigative practices considered by Professor Slobogin than he does."); Al­
schuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85 (citing Bok to assert that lying "raises deon­
tological concerns that should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders of 
deceptive interrogation"). 
77. See SiSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978) 
(discussing whether there are such things as justifiable lies and the circumstances in which 
they would occur). 
78. See id. at 97, 1 14-29 (advising an evaluation of the alternatives, consequences, and 
effects of lying). 
79. See id. at 141-53; Commentators have reached widely divergent conclusions on 
whether Bok's theories permit the regular use of deception during interrogation. The differ­
ent views arise because of disagreement over when a criminal suspect should be deemed an 
enemy within Bok's theory. Compare Paris, Lying, supra note 47, 817, 819-20 (relying on 
Bok to find virtually all deception prohibited), with Slobogin, supra note 8, at 806 (relying on 
Bok to find that suspects are "enemies" and can be lied to once they are held pursuant to a 
probable cause determination). Professor Mosteller suggests "the most appropriate reading 
of [Bok's] work is that the declared-enemies category applies only to a small subset of crimi­
nal defendants . . .  and not to the typical investigation of past individual criminal conduct." 
Mosteller, supra note 76, at 834. Professor Alschuler suggests that the concerns raised by 
reference to Bok's theories "should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders 
of deceptive interrogation." Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85. 
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cepted part of life - from enthusiastic sales pitches to polite greetings 
and comments.80 
Second, the rules and expectations governing discourse between 
citizens does not necessarily apply to police questioning of criminal 
suspects. Given society's interest in catching criminals, lying during in­
terrogation can be justified as an appropriate means toward achieving 
this important social end. Thus, conduct by the police towards a crimi­
nal suspect cannot be judged by reference to what is morally worthy 
during interactions between family members, friends, neighbors, and 
acquaintances. 
F. Pragmatic Concerns 
In contrast to principled criteria for limiting deceptive interroga­
tion practices, commentators have also advanced pragmatic reasons 
offered for limiting deception during interrogation. The chief prag­
matic reason is the slippery slope argument that permitting lying dur­
ing interrogation leads to widespread police lying in other contexts, 
including warrants, affidavits, and sworn testimony.81 Some officers, 
like some civilian witnesses, do lie under oath. But we assume that or­
dinary people - such as witnesses, jurors, and even defendants - un­
derstand the significance of the oath. Similarly, police officers know, 
and should be expected to know, what is appropriate and lawful dur­
ing the many different duties they perform - undercover agent, beat 
officer, interrogator, affiant, and witness.82 
80. William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1903, 1910 (1993) [hereinafter Stuntz, Lawyers]. 
Id. 
In moral terms, the most reasonable explanation for this behavior is that people make dis­
tinctions, based on the relative harmfulness of telling the truth versus dissembling, on 
whether the false statement is defensive or offensive, or on whether the motivation is selfish 
or altruistic. Whether the conduct is wrong, and if so how much, depends on context. 
81. See, e.g., Leo & Skolnick, supra note 32, at 9 ("When police are permitted to lie in 
the interrogation context, why should they refrain from lying to judges when applying for 
warrants, from violating internal police organization rules against lying, or from lying in the 
courtroom?"); Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 829 ("[L]ying in the interrogation context may 
lead to police perjury under oath."); Young, supra note 9, at 463 (asserting that lying during 
interrogation will teach officers to become accomplished liars, and suggesting that officers 
may lie to obtain an adrenaline rush). 
82. Commentators raising these evidentiary concerns have not addressed the matter of 
either undercover investigations or the use of ruses during searches. The dangers alleged to 
arise from deceptive interrogation would seem just as likely, if not more likely, to arise from 
the deceptions used during undercover operations or as ruses to search. If officers can be 
relied on to understand the line between undercover operations and sworn testimony, they 
are equally able to distinguish between interrogation and sworn testimony. 
There is one pragmatic concern that has caused a court to exclude a confession because 
of the use of a deceptive interrogation technique. In the 1989 case of Florida v. Cayward, 552 
So. 2d 971 (1989), the state court held that there is a distinct difference between acceptable 
verbal deception and fabrication of scientific documentation, which has the potential to 
reach the courtroom. Cayward specifically held that the police should not have created a 
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G. Criticism of the Non-reliability Rationales for Limiting 
Interrogation Techniques 
Many of the rationales offered for limiting deceptive interrogation 
techniques, if taken to their logical extreme, would bar not only decep­
tive interrogation techniques, but other investigative methods as well. 
Commentators have failed to explain adequately why deception must 
be barred or substantially limited during interrogation, while the de­
ception used in other areas - such as undercover investigations, wire­
taps, ruses, and informants - may continue.83 A bar on deception 
during all stages of investigation would make it very difficult to solve 
some crimes.84 
Some commentators suggesting limits on interrogation techniques 
appear most concerned with whether a technique is effective in elicit­
ing confessions. Yet effectiveness is an inappropriate basis for limiting 
interrogation. The voluntariness requirement does not bar effective 
interrogation, or even reflect a general hostility to the concept of po­
lice interrogation.85 "Indeed, far from being prohibited by the 
Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are in-
false lab report purporting to connect semen found on the five-year-old rape and murder 
victim to the nineteen-year-old suspect. Id. Relying on Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), 
the court acknowledged that verbal deception does not render a confession involuntary. The 
court, however, distinguished deception by false documents. 552 So. 2d at 975. The court 
concluded that there was an unacceptably high risk that such false evidence used during in­
terrogation would somehow be included in the file and later considered true evidence at 
trial. Id. at 975 (suggesting that the heavy caseload of courts may allow manufactured docu­
ments to be used as substantive evidence against the defendant). Although this is a danger 
that should be addressed by appropriate police and prosecution procedures, the Cayward 
court's wholesale bar on documentary deception is overbroad. 
83. See Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 679 (acknowledging that wiretaps and 
informants are no more respectful of a suspect's dignity than police interrogations). 
84. See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 778 ("Undercover work is by definition deceptive. It 
normally involves outright lies."). 
85. A few commentators have freely acknowledged their distaste for much or all police 
interrogation. See, e.g. , BORCHARD, supra note 9, xvii (urging a rule "prohibiting the use in 
evidence of all confessions made to the police"); Martin H. Belsky, Living with Miranda: A 
Reply to Professor Grano, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 141 (1994) (analogizing intimidating in­
terrogation to child abuse, spouse abuse, or rape); Driver, supra note 57, at 60-61 (1968) ( ar­
guing that abolition of police interrogation may be necessary to eliminate coercion); 
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 91, 113 ("We have a philosophical predilection" 
for the position "that confessions be considered of no evidentiary value."); Bernard 
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY 21, 46 (1961) (asserting that police interrogation is "irreconcilable" with the 
self-incrimination privilege). 
A number of commentators have proposed that magistrates, not the police, question 
suspects. See, e.g. , Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: 
The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 908 (1995); Dripps, supra note 9; Paul 
G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). 
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herently desirable."86 Presumably in recognition of .the importance of 
confessions, some commentators urging limits have wisely shifted 
away from arguments rooted largely in the effectiveness of interroga­
tion techniques, and focused more on the reliability concern.87 
IV. BASING LIMITS ON DECEPTION DURING INTERROGATION ON 
RELIABILITY CONCERNS 
A. Commentator Recognition of Reliability as the Limiting Principle 
Despite the wide variety of rationales proffered for the voluntari­
ness requirement, scholars have increasingly emphasized the reliability 
rationale.88 Under the reliability rationale, a court must ask whether 
the procedure used to obtain a confession creates an unreasonable risk 
that an innocent person would falsely confess.89 
According to many of these scholars, empirical evidence shows 
that deceptive interrogation practices cause a significant number of 
false confessions.90 Because the reliability rationale focuses on pro­
tecting innocent suspects, it offers a more palatable - and appropriate 
- reason for limiting interrogation.91 The increased scholarly empha-
86. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977). Professor Grano has been 
the most thoughtful commentator on the inherent value of confessions. See, e.g. , Joseph D. 
Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1061 (1992); Joseph D. Grano, 
Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
174 (1988). 
87. Compare, e.g. , White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 613-23 (1979) (focusing on a 
concern that guilty suspects would make an irrational or poor choice about the desirability of 
confessing), with White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 105 (emphasizing the risk of 
false confessions and the reliability rationale for the voluntariness requirement). 
88. See, e.g. , Alschuler, supra note 10, at 975 (including reliability as the chief reason for 
advocating limits on the use of deception); White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 138-42 
(discussing the constitutional basis and the formulation of procedural safeguards); Young, 
supra note 9, 461 (including reliability as one basis for a broad argument against lying). 
89. There are obvious parallels between the increased focus on reliability by critics of 
police interrogation and the growing "innocence movement" by opponents of the death 
penalty. See, e.g. , Sara Rimer, Support For a Moratorium On Executions Gets Stronger, N.Y. 
TIMES, October 31, 2000, at Al8. 
90. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences]; 
White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 110 (arguing that "the empirical evidence shows 
that standard interrogation techniques are likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a 
significant number of cases"). 
91. See Mosteller, supra note 76, at 837 ("[C]hanges in the law that increase procedural 
protections are practical possibilities if they have a greater probability of protecting the in­
nocent. This point dovetails with the reality of popular societal reaction and contemporary 
press coverage: not surprisingly, it will be abuses of authority involving innocent people that 
will likely provoke restrictions on investigative deception, and restrictions that are more 
likely to prevent abuses affecting the innocent are, relatively speaking, more politically vi­
able."). 
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sis on false confessions has gained greater public support than the 
more abstract arguments against deception. Professors Leo and Ofshe, 
in particular, have been able to present their research and arguments 
extensively in the popular press.92 
B. The False Confession Costs of Deceptive 
Interrogation Practices 
1 .  Claims of Significant Numbers of False Confessions 
A number of commentators who have urged limitations on inter­
rogation techniques have made alarming assertions that the false con­
fession problem is widespread.93 In recent years, Professors Leo and 
Ofshe have claimed that " [p]olice-induced false confessions are a seri­
ous problem for the American criminal justice system" because "con­
fessions by the innocent still occur regularly."94 They assert that 
"police-induced false confessions occur often and are highly likely to 
lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution, conviction, and/or incarcera­
tion of the innocent."95 They further claim that contemporary psycho­
logical methods are "apt to cause an innocent person to confess,"96 and 
that " [w]hen police interrogate suspects whose guilt is a mere possi­
bility rather than a reasonable likelihood, they run a significant risk of 
92. See, e.g. , Joseph P. Shapiro, The Wrong Men on Death Row, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, November 9, 1988; Robin Topping, False Confessions, Do the innocent sometimes 
admit to crimes?, NEWSDAY, August 27, 1997, at A34; see also Rivera Live (NBC television 
broadcast, April 30, 1997) available at 1997 WL 4603535 (explaining that the police use de­
ception during interrogation). 
93. See, e.g. , MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE 
WRONGLY CONVICTED 85 (1991) (false confessions "are commonplace"); see also EDWARD 
D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS 8-9 (1964) (suggesting that five percent of convictions are mis­
carriages of justice in which an innocent person is imprisoned); Alschuler, Constraint, supra 
note 10, at 974 ("Especially when suspects are retarded or easily suggestible and when de­
ception is coupled with intimations that leniency will follow confession, this misrepresenta­
tion is likely to generate false confessions." (emphasis added)); Michael L. Perlin, "I'll Give 
You Shelter from the Storm ": Privilege, Confidentiality, and Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1996) (relying on Bedau, Radelet, and Huff to conclude that as 
"many as 740 erroneous convictions each year may be due to false confessions"); Thomas N. 
Thomas, Book Review, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 343, 344-46, 349 (1996) (reviewing LAWRENCE 
WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (1993) and asserting, 
without citation support, that "many confessions are false" and that both spontaneous and 
police-induced false confessions are "common," and reviewing GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY (1992) and asserting 
that Gudjonsson reveals that "the interrogation process . . .  can easily evoke false confes­
sions"). 
94. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983. 
95. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to 
Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENY. L. REV. 
1 135, 1139 (1997) [hereinafter Missing the Forest]. 
96. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983. 
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eliciting a false confession."97 Finally, Professors Leo and Ofshe reach 
the sweeping conclusion that "many investigators have recognized" 
that "the problems caused by police-induced false confessions are sig­
nificant [and] recurrent. "98 
Professors Leo and Ofshe have found that "[i]t is well established 
that psychologically-induced false confessions occur frequently 
enough to warrant the concern of criminal justice officials, legislators 
and the general public."99 In comments outside of their written work, 
they have portrayed the false confession problem even more alarm­
ingly, asserting that false confessions happen "all the time."100 
Professors Leo and Ofshe are not alone in suggesting that the false 
confession problem is widespread. For example, Professor White has 
stated that false confessions are obtained in a "significant" number of 
cases,101 and that police interrogation "often yields false confes­
sions. " 102 He concludes that the empirical data "indicates that confes­
sions induced by standard interrogation methods are frequently un-
97. Id. at 986. 
98. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 430. 
99. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: 
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 561 (1998). 
100. See Maugh II, supra note 6, at Al; Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 23, 
1997) ("Innocent people confess all the time . . . .  We know it happens all the time."); 
Defense Expert Says Boy Forced to Confess, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 29, 1999, at 
5-8 (quoting Dr. Ofshe as testifying that "people often confess to crimes they didn't commit 
because of police tactics"). Professor Ofshe is reported to have claimed that as many as 60% 
of people might falsely confess to a crime when interrogated. See Gail Johnson, False 
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations, 6 8.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 729 (1997) (citing CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: 
THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A 
"WRONG MAN" 97 (Donald S. Connery ed., 1996) (describing Professor Ofshe's comments 
at a 1995 public forum in Hartford, Connecticut titled "Convicting the Innocent"). 
101 . White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("Over the past two decades, a sig­
nificant number of suspects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led 
them to give false confessions."); id. at 1 10 ("(S]tandard interrogation techniques [are] likely 
to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a significant number of cases."). But see Paul G. 
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 488 
(1996) (referring to the "esoteric problem of false confessions induced by noncoercive police 
questioning") [hereinafter Cassell, Social Costs]. 
102. Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United 
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1209 n.4 (1980) ("Those who have sought to limit 
police interrogation believe that interrogation, often carried out in secret, involves coercion, 
and often yields false confessions."). Yet he also concedes that "(t)here are only a small 
number of documented cases in which standard interrogation methods have led to indis­
putably false confessions." White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. 
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trustworthy,"103 and that "standard interrogation methods precipitate a 
significant number of false confessions."104 
These repeated and widely-reported assertions that "contemporary 
psychological methods" are "apt" to cause an innocent suspect to con­
fess are verifiable and should be verified. 105 Yet, thus far, no one has 
undertaken the research necessary to prove the claims.106 
2. Empirical Data on False Confessions Is Limited 
These alarming claims that false confessions are widespread do not 
hold up under scrutiny. Although there are reports - in both the aca­
demic and popular press - about individual instances of purportedly 
false confessions, there is no sound empirical proof that such instances 
are widespread.107 Thus far, the reports have failed to rebut the intui­
tive view108 that the number of persons incarcerated because of police­
induced false confessions is quite small. 
The existing research is almost entirely anecdotal and focuses on 
the causes, not the scope, of the problem. Sweeping references to sig­
nificant, substantial, and widespread instances of false confessions are 
supported by reference to perhaps a few dozen indisputably false con­
fessions. To justify the claim that the false confession problem is wide­
spread, the new research will need to be based on a statistically signifi­
cant, randomly-drawn sample of persons who gave confessions during 
interrogation. To determine whether there is a substantial concern 
that any of the confessors may actually be innocent, researchers would 
103. White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. Yet he also concludes that it is 
"impossible to estimate" the "number of false confessions," White, Involuntary Confession, 
supra note 10, at 2039, and that "there are only a small number of documented cases in 
which standard interrogation methods have led to indisputably false confessions." White, 
False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. 
104. White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2042; see also White, False 
Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("Over the past two decades, a significant number of sus­
pects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led them to give false con­
fessions."). 
105. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983. 
106. See id. at 1 135 (acknowledging that there has been no research "to quantify the 
number and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of 
justice"). 
107. See Cassell, Balanced Approaches, supra note 7, at 1 125-26 (stating that "the em­
pirical linchpin" for the proposals of Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler "is simply missing"). Despite 
the spirited, on-going debate about police interrogation and confessions, there are surpris­
ingly few studies of confession evidence. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. 
KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM ix (1993) ("[I]n contrast to the massive num­
bers of eyewitness studies, the topic of confession evidence has been almost completely ig­
nored by psychologists and other social scientists."). 
108. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("The idea that a suspect, who 
is neither insane nor the victim of physical coercion, will confess to a crime he did not com­
mit seems counterintuitive."). 
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need to examine all available evidence, starting with the court records. 
It appears that no one has attempted such statistically sound research 
on false confessions. · 
a. Most Research Is on the Causes and Types, Not the Number, of 
False Confessions. Based on the assertions of a widespread false con­
fession problem, one would expect to see hundreds, if not thousands, 
of false confession cases documented. Yet no such evidence exists. In­
stead, research on false confessions falls into two categories. First, 
there are articles referring to collections of several, or at most several 
dozen, case histories of allegedly wrongful convictions because of false 
confessions.109 Second, there are studies, generally by psychologists, 
not lawyers, on the causes of false confessions. 
To justify substantial limits on the ability of the police to solve 
crimes by interrogating suspects, two questions must be answered: 1) 
why do some suspects falsely confess; and 2) how many false confes­
sions are actually given. The first question, why a person would falsely 
confess, must be answered to determine whether limiting certain po­
lice conduct would even have the effect of preventing false confessors 
from confessing. For example, if most false confessors are like the de­
fendant in Colorado v. Connelly,110 who confessed independently of 
police action, then there is no point in limiting police conduct. Even if 
the research should establish that police conduct can cause false con­
fessions, we cannot decide whether to limit that conduct without an­
swering the second question on how often the conduct causes false 
confessions. Although there is a fair bit of research on the first ques­
tion - why a person might falsely confess 1 1 1  - there is absolutely 
none that adequately answers the second question - how often this 
phenomenon takes place. Advocates of limits on interrogation tactics 
fail to make the critical distinction between research on why anyone 
might falsely confess and how often suspects actually make false con­
fessions. 
109. Professors Leo and Ofshe present twenty-nine cases, involving mostly homicides, 
from 1973 to 1996. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 429, 435, 478. (The 
authors present sixty disputed confession cases, but only twenty-nine of the defendants were 
convicted or pied guilty). During that time, the police interrogated many thousands of sus­
pects for homicide. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and 
Lost Confessions - and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 506 n.36 (sur­
veying 80% of the 460,000 persons arrested for murder and manslaughter according to the 
FBI reports) [hereinafter Cassell, Protecting the Innocent]; see also "Felony Sentences in the 
United States 1996," BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ 175045 (reporting 
that there were 1 1 ,766 murder cases in the United States in 1996). 
1 10. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
1 1 1. See, e.g., Gail Johnson, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 719 at 726, 729 (explaining that 
" [m]odern psychology has come a long way towards a more complex and sophisticated un­
derstanding of the interplay of factors to leading to false confessions," but deeming "unan­
swerable" how many people would falsely confess during interrogation). 
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At best, the existing research has shown: 1) that certain interroga­
tion techniques are more likely than other techniques to result in false 
confession; and 2) that certain types of people - such as juveniles and 
the mentally impaired - appear somewhat more likely than the aver­
age suspect to give a false confession. The research has not demon­
strated, however, how often the techniques in question result in false 
confessions, nor what number of suspects in these more vulnerable 
groups give false confessions. The fact that persons in these vulnerable 
groups appear to be over-represented in the few false confession cases 
that have been collected and examined does not demonstrate that per­
sons in these groups give false confessions at a substantial rate. The 
existing research is interesting, but it provides no basis for imposing 
limits on the current practice of using deception during interrogation. 
Commentators asserting that there is a widespread, significant 
problem with false confessions have relied primarily on three scholarly 
works: 1 )  the 1987 Bedau-Radelet study of 350 purportedly erroneous 
convictions in potentially capital cases since 1900;1 12 2) the 1998 Leo­
Ofshe study of sixty post-Miranda cases involving purportedly false 
confessions; and, 3) Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson's 1992 book on the causes 
and types of false confessions. 1 1 3  These works suggest only why an in­
nocent person might falsely confess, 1 14 not how many people actually 
do falsely confess. 
1 12. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 107, at 84 
(lamenting that Bedau and Radelet's review "has not received the attention it deserves" and 
uncritically describing all 350 examples in the study as involving an "innocent person"); see 
also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 433 n.9 (relying on Bedau and Radelet). 
1 13. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS 
AND TESTIMONY (1992). See, e.g., Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 972-73 (citing 
Gudjonsson); Thomas, supra note 93, at 350 (citing only Bedau and Radelet as support for 
the assertion that police-induced false confessions are "common"). 
Many commentators also refer to the much earlier work of Edward Borchard, which 
presents sixty-five cases of purportedly wrongful convictions of innocent persons. See 
BORCHARD, supra note 9; see, e.g. , Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 433 n.7. 
Borchard acknowledged that only a very few of these sixty-five cases involved false confes­
sions. He found that the causes or alleged error were "in the main, mistaken identification, 
circumstantial evidence (from which erroneous inferences are drawn), or perjury, or some 
combination of these factors." BORCHARD, supra, at viii. 
Commentators also refer to two other books: JEROME FRANK AND BARBARA FRANK, 
NOT GUILTY (1957) (reviewing cases of convictions of allegedly innocent persons), and 
RADIN, supra note 93. Other more recent works cited with some regularity are: 1) Professor 
Saul M. Kassin's and Professor Lawrence S. Wrightsman's writings on the causes of false 
confessions, see, e.g. , Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 221 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67-94 (Saul M. Kassin & 
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, eds., 1985); and 2) Professor Ronald Huff's 1986 opinion survey 
about false confessions, see C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful 
Conviction and Public Policy, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986). 
114. Professors Leo and Ofshe have identified three types of false confessors in cases 
where the police allegedly induced a false confession. See Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess 
Falsely, supra note 10, at 998-1000. The first type, the stress-compliant false confessor, 
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The widely-cited study by Professors Bedau and Radelet does not 
examine any randomly drawn sample of cases. Instead, Professors 
Bedau and Radelet collected 350 cases from the many thousands de­
cided in this century when the defendant received or could have re­
ceived a capital sentence. Although they concluded that the confession 
was false in forty-nine of these cases, they acknowledge that few, if 
any, of these forty-nine allegedly false confessions were caused by po­
lice deception. As they explain, some of the confessions were "the re­
sult of mental illness;" one defendant confessed "as a joke;" and an­
other claimed to have confessed "to · impress his girlfriend."115 In 
selecting and describing just forty-nine cases of allegedly false confes­
sions from the thousands of capital or potentially capital cases decided 
in this century, Professors Bedau and Radelet provide no support for 
the claim that false confessions are widespread. Their research is of 
particularly limited use in evaluating interrogation techniques used 
now, because they included so many cases from the earlier part of the 
century, when both discrimination against minority suspects and the 
use of physical abuse against all suspects were far more common.1 16 
In their 1998 study of false confessions, Professors Leo and Ofshe 
presented a collection of sixty cases, selected from the many hundreds 
of thousands of confession cases decided after Miranda, in which they 
believed the confessions were false. As they acknowledge, those sixty 
cases "do not constitute a statistically adequate sample of false confes­
sion cases. "1 17 Thus, their study focused not on the number of false 
"makes this choice to escape an experience that for him has always been excessively stressful 
or one that has become intolerably punishing because it has gone beyond the bounds of a 
legally proper interrogation." Id. at 997. Within the context of the legal doctrine about vol­
untariness, the "stress-compliant" false.confessor just seems like another way of saying that 
the physical and psychological pressures are so great that an innocent person would confess. 
The existing law, under the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness, would almost 
surely bar any such pressures that would make an innocent person confess. 
The second type, the coerced-compliant false confessor, confesses "(i)n response to clas­
sically coercive interrogation techniques such as threats of harm and/or promises of leni­
ency . . . . " Id. at 998. The third type, the persuaded false confessor, confesses after becoming 
convinced that it is more likely than not that he committed the crime, despite possessing no 
memory of having done so. Id. at 999 ("A non-coerced persuaded false confession is elicited 
when an investigator relies on routine influence techniques of interrogation, whereas a co­
erced-persuaded false confession is elicited when threats, promises, or other legally coercive 
interrogation techniques are added to this mix."). 
Professor White categorizes false confessions similarly but uses only two categories. The 
"coerced-compliant" confession occurs when "a suspect knows he is confessing falsely but 
confesses in order to obtain some goal or 'escape from a stressful or an intolerable situa­
tion' . . . .  " White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 109 (quoting GUDJONSSON, supra 
note 113, at 228). "Coerced-internalized" confessions occur when a "suspect comes to be­
lieve in his own guilt." Id. 
115. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 112, at 63. 
1 16. Fewer than ten percent of the 350 cases involved defendants convicted after 1977, 
when the Supreme Court upheld the revised death penalty. 
1 17. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 435. 
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confession cases, but only on whether there were any shared charac­
teristics in the very small number of false confession cases that were 
presented. 
Dr. Gudjonsson's book, the leading work on false confessions,118 is 
based on cases outside of this country.1 19 The book contains illustrative 
case histories of false confessions, but no random sample of confession 
cases. Dr. Gudjonsson focuses on perhaps a few dozen cases of pur­
portedly false confessions.1 2° He offers interesting case studies of a 
number of individual cases, but no data on the total number of false 
confession cases. 
Thus far, the studies on false confessions fail to prove, or even 
strongly to suggest, that a significant number of persons have been 
wrongly convicted because of false confessions obtained by police us­
ing deceptive interrogation techniques.121 The commentators have not 
1 18. See Scheflin, supra note 4, at 1296 ("The leading text on false confessions is 
Gudjonsson's 1992 book, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony."). 
1 19. Dr. Gudjonsson conducted his research in Great Britain. His book is not necessar­
ily helpful in understanding the interrogation process in this country because the process in 
Great Britain is somewhat different. On the one hand, the British have no analogue to 
Miranda and no right to remain silent; on the other hand, the British police are more con­
strained in their use of deception. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 113, at 278; see also James 
R. Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confessions Expert Testimony, Department of Army 
Pamphlet 27-50-321 (August 1999) (discussing the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 
1984, sections 76 and 78, which states that deception may render a confession unreliable). 
120. See Kassin & Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 113, at 67-94. Both authors are psychology 
professors. 
121. The one study that concludes that there are a large number of wrongful convictions 
of innocent persons, and at least suggests that some portion of these many cases might be 
due to false confessions, is utterly flawed. See C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven 
Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986). In 1986, 
Professors Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin asserted that a "conservative estimate" of the number 
of wrongful convictions of innocent persons each year was 6,000. They arrived at this num­
ber without assembling a random sample or examining any case files. Instead, they obtained 
a figure for the frequency of wrongful convictions by surveying the opinions of 177 persons 
involved in the criminal justice system, from sheriffs to judges to public defenders. It is 
hardly clear why all of these people were deemed to know a figure that most other research­
ers assert is either elusive or unknowable. 
The survey was both framed and interpreted in a highly misleading manner. Respon­
dents were asked to estimate the number of wrongful convictions. They were given only the 
following choices as possible answers: Never, Less than 1 %, 1-5%, 6-10%. Because just one 
case of wrongful conviction would have to exclude the answer "never," not surprisingly, few 
respondents gave that answer. Also hardly surprising was the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the respondents chose the next lowest category offered as a choice, "Less than 
1 %." Of course, the category of all estimates "Less than 1 %" but greater than zero is quite 
broad. It includes estimates as high as 1 out of 101 as well as estimates of 1 in 1000, 1 in 
10,000, 1 in 100,000, and, in fact, every barely perceptible estimate as long as it is higher than 
zero. Thus, the construction of the survey question should have allowed the researchers to 
reach almost no conclusion about the estimates by the respondents. Yet the researchers de­
cided to simply take the mid-point of their very broad range and settled on an estimate of 
one-half of 1 % or 1 in 200. They then multiplied this quite high rate of error by an enormous 
figure representing the number of convictions in this country each year for serious crimes. 
Thus, they were able to arrive at an alarmingly large number - 6,000 - of purportedly 
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produced credible evidence that there is a serious problem that should 
be addressed by substantially limiting police efforts to obtain confes­
sions. 122 
b. Inclusion of Cases Without Convictions. The existing studies are 
also weakened by the inclusion of persons who gave false confessions 
but who were never brought to trial and convicted. For example, in 
the Leo-Ofshe collection of sixty cases involving false confessions, 
only 29 of the cases involved a person who was actually convicted after 
making a false confession.123 In the remaining cases, the criminal jus­
tice system successfully identified the unreliability of the confessions 
at some point before conviction. Instances in which the system worked 
as it is supposed to - by weeding out false confessions before an er­
roneous conviction - do not provide a sound basis for drastically lim­
iting police efforts to obtain confessions from all suspects, many of 
whom are guilty of serious offenses.124 Thus, researchers should focus 
on those instances of allegedly false confessions in which the defen­
dant has exhausted his appeals. 
c. Inappropriate Sources to Establish Innocence. To verify a 
wrongful conviction, it is necessary to determine whether a convicted 
person is, in fact, innocent. Actual innocence is a certainty in only a 
small fraction of the cases that researchers have used to illustrate the 
wrongful convictions. This number, however, is based on a completely speculative assump­
tion that the respondents were reporting estimates of 1 in 200, rather than much lower esti­
mates. 
This sleight of hand with statistics tells us very little about how many wrongful convic­
tions actually occurred, or even much about what the 177 respondents believe. In conducting 
surveys about matters that may be quite rare, survey questions must be carefully crafted to 
allow for answers that reveal the true rarity of the matter being studied. 
122. Even while asserting that there is a significant false confession problem, some 
commentators have acknowledged that there are, in fact, few documented cases. See, e.g. , 
White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2043 (recognizing that "a court might con­
clude that the empirical data" on the false confession problem is "tentative and fragmen­
tary"). Professors Leo and Ofshe, tacitly acknowledging that their list of cases falls well short 
of establishing that false confessions happen regularly, assert that "it is reasonable to assume 
that the reported cases represent only the proverbial tip of the false confession iceberg." Leo 
& Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 139. No such assumption is reasonable. The 
actual frequency of false confessions should be established by studying a random sample of 
confession cases and not by speculation based largely on isolated cases reported in the me­
dia. 
123. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 473. 
124. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 536. ("If a person who has 
made a false confession is not convicted - because the police do not arrest, the prosecutor 
does not indict, or the jury does not convict - then the screens in the system have at least 
worked to prevent the ultimate miscarriage of justice, the conviction of an innocent per­
son."); see also Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of 
Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 408 (1987) ("A misidentified defendant who goes to trial un­
doubtedly runs a terrible risk of being convicted in error, but it does not take blind faith in 
trials by jury to believe that the risk is considerably smaller than it is for a guilty defendant 
and that this highly imperfect filter reduces the number of erroneous convictions considera­
bly."). 
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problem of wrongful convictions in general and false confessions in 
particular. Innocence is most clearly and easily established by the 
criminal justice system itself, when it overturns convictions on grounds 
of innocence. Actual innocence is unequivocally established, for ex­
ample, when a court overturns a confessor's conviction because DNA 
evidence establishes that the defendant did not commit the crime. 
There are few cases, however, involving judicial determinations of 
wrongful convictions in cases of purportedly false confessions. In fact, 
many of the persons whom scholars have labeled as innocent are still 
in prison because no judge has agreed with the researchers' and de­
fendant's claims of innocence. 
The methodology used to establish the innocence of convicted per­
sons raises significant concerns. Because there are so few judicial de­
terminations of actual innocence, researchers have looked for other 
evidence demonstrating innocence. They have made some claims of 
innocence based, at least in part, on questionable information such as 
newspaper assertions and the defendant's own claims of innocence.125 
The reliance on questionable sources to establish innocence is ap­
parent, for example, in the Bedau-Radelet study of 350 cases of pur­
portedly wrongful convictions. Professors Bedau and Radelet assert 
that, in these cases, the defendant was subsequently "found to be in­
nocent" of the capital or potentially capital crime for which he was 
convicted.126 The phrase "found to be innocent" would seem to suggest 
that there was a judicial or other official determination of innocence. 
In fact, for some of the cases, the finding of innocence is a conclusion 
reached by Professors Bedau and Radelet. Many of the defendants 
deemed innocent by them actually served their sentences or remain 
imprisoned because the courts made no such finding of innocence. 
Professors Bedau and Radelet do make several concessions. First, they 
admit that the evidence convincing them of innocence in some cases 
"may not convince others." 127 Second, they admit that their decision to 
include "a few borderline cases may look to other investigators to be 
not only debatable but even incorrect." 128 Third, they concede that 
"the cases form a continuum, from those where the evidence for inno­
cence is conclusive to those where the evidence is slight."129 
125. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 578-79 (criticizing Leo and 
Ofshe's use of seemingly questionable sources); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, 
Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122 
(1988). 
126. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 1 12, at 24; see also id. at 38 (asserting that the defen-
dants had been "proved to be innocent"). 
127. Id. at 47. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 47-48. They also concede that " [i]n none of these cases, however, can we 
point to the implication of another person or to the confession of the true killer, much Jess to 
any official action admitting the execution of an innocent person." Id. at 74. 
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In addition to these admitted defects, a significant problem with 
the Bedau-Radelet study is that it appears to give greater weight to 
potentially unreliable post-conviction statements than to the decisions 
of juries and trial judges that were upheld by appellate judges.13° The 
method of establishing innocence used by Professors Leo and Of she is 
questionable. To determine whether a confession is probably false and 
the defendant probably innocent, they examined the defendant's own 
post-admission narrative and looked for evidence corroborating the 
confession. This method of determining innocence is can be "highly 
subjective. "131 Despite these limitations, other researchers have incor­
rectly claimed that the Bedau-Radelet studies present "known" in­
stances of wrongful convictions of false confessors.132 
C. The Value of Deception During Interrogation 
Deceptive interrogation techniques have value. Deception is 
needed to obtain some confessions, confessions are needed to obtain 
some convictions, and those convictions provide great value to society 
- specifically to existing victims, future potential victims, and inno­
cent persons who might have been wrongly charged absent a confes­
sion by the true perpetrator.133 
130. See Markman & Cassell, supra note 125, at 126. 
131. James R. Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confessions Expert Testimony, 
Department of Army Pamphlet 27-50-321 (August 1999); Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, 
supra note 109, at 505 ("[I]n a significant number of their cases, the 'innocent' defendants 
were in all likelihood guilty."). Moreover, for some cases Professors Leo and Ofshe refer 
chiefly to media accounts as the source of evidence of innocence. See Leo & Ofshe, 
Consequences, supra note 90, at 449. Media accounts are not necessarily a reliable source for 
definitively establishing .innocence. The press bias may be to find an innocent person 
wrongly convicted, since it is not news that a guilty person is in prison. 
132. See Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 973 n.78 ("For an indication of the fre­
quency of known false confessions (no more than the tip of the iceberg)," see the works of 
Professors White, Bedau and Radelet, Leo and Ofshe). Professor Alschuler, like others, has 
accepted the studies by Professors Leo and Ofshe, and Professors Bedau and Radelet, with­
out questioning what evidence there is of innocence. Professor Alschuler refers to these 
studies as concerning cases of "known" innocence, even though the researchers themselves 
concede that in many of their cases, the innocence is, at best, possible or probable, and there 
has been no judicial acknowledgement of the purportedly "known" innocence of the defen­
dant. See also Gregory W. O'Reilly, Comment on lngraham's "Moral Duty" To Talk and the 
Right to Silence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 539 (1997) (relying on Bedau and 
Radelet after asserting that "the innocent are convicted"). 
133. See Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1905 ("Deception and advantage taking 
are . . .  at the core of criminal investigation . . . .  "). 
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1 .  Deception Is Needed to Obtain Some Confessions 
In some instances, the police must use deception to obtain a con­
fession from a suspect.134 Relatively few suspects enter the interroga­
tion room and promptly offer a full and truthful confession of their 
wrongdoing. Confessions usually occur only after some form of decep­
tion by the officer, from hiding the officer's true feelings about the 
suspect or the nature of the crime to exaggerating the strength of the 
evidence. Officers use deception because experience has taught them 
that it works. 135 Effective interrogations necessarily depend upon a 
single but significant lie - the "Big Lie." The Big Lie is that it is 
somehow in the suspect's best interest to confess. In reality, making an 
uncounseled confession to an officer is rarely in a suspect's best inter­
est. 136 If an interrogator were truly honest, he would inform the sus­
pect that it is generally not in the suspect's best interest to make any 
134. Professor lnbau, author of the leading police manual, has explained that "[i]n 
dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with criminal suspects who may actu­
ally be innocent, the interrogator must of necessity employ less refined methods than are 
considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, everyday affairs by and between law­
abiding citizens." lnbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 19. Inbau observes that con­
versation between officer and suspect during interrogation does not proceed as it would be­
tween two citizens in everyday life. Id. Interrogation is part of criminal investigation, not 
everyday life. There is no reason to require interrogation during an investigation to be any 
more genteel than a search and seizure during an investigation. For example, a person who 
seems to have lost an item does not upend a friend's house and search for it even if he has 
some suspicion that the friend accidentally or intentionally obtained the item. Yet the police, 
based on probable cause, may conduct a probing search of a home that will be fairly un­
pleasant for the homeowner. 
135. In his observational study of almost 200 interrogations, Professor Leo found that it 
was commonplace for the police to confront the suspect with false evidence. He found that 
in 30% of the interrogations, the police confronted the suspect with false evidence of his 
guilt. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
621, 623 (1996). 
Most commentators do not dispute the point that deception is necessary to obtain some 
confessions. See, e.g. , White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 1 1 1  (stating that "interroga­
tion is indispensable to law enforcement"). But see Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 ("It is 
far from clear that the amount of information derived from interrogations would be signifi­
cantly reduced if police were required to tell the truth."). In fact, the arguments against de­
ception are based on the notion that deception is too effective, and that a confession is far 
more likely to be obtained when the interrogating officer uses some deception than when the 
officer is entirely truthful. Thus, some of the arguments against deception reflect a view that 
the police should simply get along with fewer confessions. 
136. See DA YID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 213 (Ballantine 
Books 1993) ("The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect's interest to talk with police 
will forever be the catalyst in any criminal interrogation. It is a fiction propped up against 
the greater weight of logic itself . . . .  "); H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 210 (1988) 
(" 'Anybody who stops and thinks about it has to know that he's hurting himself by admit­
ting to a crime . . .  . ' " (quoting a police officer)); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1926 ("If 
suspects fully comprehended the nature and scope of their legal rights and the likely conse­
quences of relinquishing them, there would be very few police station confessions."). 
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statement at all.137 Such a completely honest interrogator would find 
confessions awfully scarce. 
2. Confessions Are Needed to Obtain Many Convictions 
a. Convictions Lost Because of the Absence of a Confession. Some 
cases can be successfully prosecuted only with a confession from the 
defendant. The state has an extremely high burden of proof. Without a 
statement from the defendant, the physical evidence and testimony 
from witnesses are sometimes insufficient to obtain a conviction.138 In 
other cases, there is little physical evidence, the defendant conceals his 
face, or there are no witnesses. Some of the most heinous crimes, such 
as child abuse, may involve no physical evidence and no witnesses, 
other than the child who may be incompetent to testify due to age. 
Obviously, the more clever and sophisticated the criminal is, the less 
likely he is to carelessly leave behind physical evidence or witnesses. 
Confessions will sometimes offer the only hope of convicting the 
guilty.139 
b. Value of a Confession Even If Not Essential to Conviction. A 
confession may be extremely valuable in a case, even if not essential to 
a conviction. First, resolution of a case because of a confession allows 
the police to use their valuable and limited resources to investigate 
other crimes. Second, confessions greatly reduce the risk that police 
137. In the overwhelming number of cases it is contrary to a suspect's self-interest to 
confess because a confession will increase the chance that the suspect will be convicted and a 
penalty will be imposed. But Justice Scalia has pointed out that the suspect may, in fact, 
achieve some rehabilitative benefit by confessing, rather than continuing to conceal, his 
wrong-doing. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(" '(A]dmissio[n] of guilt . . .  , if not coerced, (is] inherently desirable,' . . .  because it ad­
vances the goals of both 'justice and rehabilitation.' " (quoting United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 488 n.23 
(1974))). Given that the nation's prisons serve more punitive than rehabilitative goals, and 
that rehabilitation can also occur in a private setting outside of incarceration, confessing will 
usually impose greater costs than benefits on the defendant. 
138. See Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961): 
Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses frequently occur 
about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there cannot be found innocent 
human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains - if police investigation is not to be 
balked before it has fairly begun - but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them 
questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense pre­
cisely because they are suspected of implication in it. 
See also Inbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 147 ("Many criminal cases, even 
when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by 
means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of informa­
tion obtained from the questioning of other criminal suspects."). 
139. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An 
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 905-15 (1999) (surveying 
fifty-nine prosecutors and finding that 61 % of confessions were deemed necessary to obtain 
a conviction; also finding that defendants who confessed were convicted in 78.9% of cases, 
while those questioned unsuccessfully were convicted in 49.3% of cases). 
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suspicion will fall on an innocent person. If there is no confession from 
the true wrongdoer, there is a risk that an innocent person could be 
investigated, arrested, or even falsely convicted and incarcerated.140 
Third, the existence of a confession may permit the prosecution to ob­
tain a suitable plea agreement. A confession may so strengthen the 
prosecution's case that a plea bargain to an inappropriate lesser of­
fense can be avoided. Guilty pleas free the courts to move quickly to 
resolve other cases, spare trauma to the victim, and avoid the financial 
drain on judicial and prosecutorial resources that would be consumed 
by a trial. 
3. Value of Convictions Obtained Because of Confessions 
Before considering the proposals to limit substantially various in­
terrogation techniques, it is necessary to consider the obvious benefits 
of resolving a criminal investigation with a conviction. First, the great­
est value to society is the incapacitation of the criminal. During the 
time that the offender is incarcerated, he is unable lo commit new 
crimes and victimize others. Many criminals commit far more crimes 
than the few for which they are arrested. Leaving a criminal at large 
imposes substantial risks on society. Second, if a criminal is not appre­
hended and convicted, the victim continues to suffer even after recov­
ering from the direct physical and financial injuries caused by the 
criminal. The victim's emotional recovery is less certain and takes far 
longer if the victim knows that the criminal remains at large. Both the 
victim's anxiety about suffering additional harm and the victim's un­
addressed desire for justice are significant costs incurred when the ab­
sence of a confession means that the perpetrator cannot be con­
victed.141 
Finally, if the offender is not convicted, there is no opportunity for 
rehabilitation. A conviction allows the court not only to incarcerate -
and thereby incapacitate - the offender, but also to attempt to reha­
bilitate the offender with a wide variety of programs, including proba­
tionary and parole supervision, boot camp, drug and alcohol treat­
ment, educational opportunities, parenting programs, and counseling. 
Such supervision benefits the offender who may then be able to lead a 
rewarding life as a productive citizen. Society benefits, of course, when 
the offender is rehabilitated and, thus, is no longer a threat to the 
physical, emotional, and financial well-being of innocent persons. 
1 40. See Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 109, 537-38 (1998); Stuntz, Lawyers, 
supra note 80, at 1931 ("[M]aking government investigation easier improves the welfare of 
innocent defendants."). 
141. See, e.g., Tatjana Hornle, Distribution of Punishment: The Role of a Victim 's 
Perspective, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 182 (1999) ("[A]n important function of the [crimi­
nal] sentence lies in its message to the victim."). See generally DOUGLAS BELOOF, VICTIMS 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7-33 (1998). 
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D. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Deception 
During Interrogation 
1201 
Major policy changes, such as greatly limiting interrogation, should 
be implemented only after the costs and benefits of making a change 
have been adequately considered, properly weighed, and balanced 
against each other. 
1 .  The False Confession Cost from Permitting Deception: 
Numbers Do Matter 
In assessing the cost of deceptive interrogation practices, in terms 
of wrongful convictions resulting from false confessions, numbers do 
matter. Laws that could affect nearly everyone in the country should 
not be based on a few compelling, even disturbing, anecdotes.142 The 
number of false confessors must be compared to the number of true 
confessors, and the number of false confessions we could avoid must 
be compared to the number of true confessions we would lose. Yet, 
commentators advocating substantial limits on interrogation tech­
niques have relied for support on anecdotal evidence of the false con­
fession problem. The presentation of anecdotal evidence on false con­
fessions may be sufficient to establish a need for additional, and more 
scientific, study of the matter, but anecdotal reports alone do not pro­
vide the evidence which is needed to properly weigh the costs and 
benefits of deception. 
a. Problems with Basing Policy on Anecdotal Evidence. Anecdotes 
do have value. The recitation of anecdotes, which evoke an emotional 
response, can be persuasive evidence that a problem exists. 
" [A]necdotes can crystallize and mobilize public opinion on even the 
most dull and arcane subject. Unlike statistics, anecdotes offer sim­
plicity and transparency. Little specialized knowledge is necessary to 
become outraged by a bad anecdote or self-congratulatory about a 
good one."143 For some issues, the narrative in anecdotes "puts a hu­
man face on a particular problem, brings new voices to the table, 
makes plain unexamined assumptions and implicit bias, and can en­
hance the probability of a real solution by transforming the terms of 
discourse."144 But anecdotes alone cannot provide the basis for major 
142. There is often criticism of laws with broad application that were hastily enacted 
after a single heinous crime. See, e.g. , 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, August 20, 
2000) (Professor Franklin Zimring concluded that California's three strikes legislation "was 
passed in the heat of passion" after the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-old Polly 
Klass by a defendant with a long criminal record). 
143. David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 800-01 
(1998). 
144. Id. at 807-08. 
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policy or legal changes.14s The anecdotes, which capture the attention 
of academics, the press, the public, or legislators, must be shown to be 
representative of a much larger group of such cases. 
Anecdotes standing alone, however, provide no evidence on the 
frequency of the problem they illustrate. That is why "anecdotal evi­
dence is heavily discounted in most fields. "146 The persuasive power of 
an anecdote, especially a well-told anecdote, can obscure the limited 
role of anecdotes in proving that a problem is widespread, or in ana­
lyzing the problem.147 Although " [s]cientists and medical researchers 
reject anecdotal evidence for precisely these reasons . . .  [t]he rest of 
the population is less cautious."148 Lawyers, unlike scientists, often 
embrace anecdotal evidence.149 In relying on anecdotes, commentators 
have established neither the frequency of false confessions nor that 
false confessors in the anecdotal reports are typical of the many de­
fendants who give confessions.1so 
Professors Leo and Ofshe have asserted that "the important ques­
tion is not whether false confessions are pervasive or isolated," but 
why they occur and how they can be prevented.1s1 In fact, the question 
of whether false confessions are pervasive or isolated most certainly is 
an important question. When the preventive measures suggested 
145. See id. at 807 ("[T]he adverse consequences of generalizing from an unrepresenta­
tive anecdote can be severe. Unfortunately, as the underlying subject matter becomes more 
complex and the trade-offs become tougher, the temptation to use anecdotal evidence be­
comes overwhelming."). 
146. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System - and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1992) ("Because we eas­
ily remember captivating little stories, when called on to estimate how frequent various legal 
events and outcomes are, we mistakenly associate the ease of anecdote recall with the nu­
merousness of the type of case."). 
147. Harlon Dalton, Storytelling on Its Own Terms, in LAW'S STORIES 57 (Peter Brooks 
& Paul Gewirtz eds. 1996) ("When a story is well told, I park my analytic faculties at the 
door."); Hyman, supra note 143, at 808-09 ("Critics respond that the narrative format pre­
cludes consideration of the critical issues of frequency and typicality, raises difficult issues of 
professional discourse, and may even represent the rejection of rationality."). 
148. Hyman, supra note 143, at 801. 
149. See Hyman, supra note 143, at 801-02 ("Independent of the recent boom in narra­
tive scholarship, lawyers are by training and inclination enthusiastic about anecdotal evi­
dence."); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their 
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989) (arguing that lawyers are more comfortable 
with words than numbers, with stories than statistical studies). 
150. In fact, the available evidence is that the defendants in the anecdotes are not typi­
cal of the great number of defendants who are subjected to interrogation and who give con­
fessions. The false confessors in the anecdotes appear to include a much larger percentage of 
juveniles and mentally impaired persons than is typical of criminal defendants in general. See 
Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 584; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Nar­
ratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 742 (1997) ("The significance of a story of oppression de­
pends on its representativeness . . .  [T]o evaluate policies for dealing with the ugliness we 
must know its frequency, a question that is in the domain of social science rather than of nar­
rative."). 
151. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1140. 
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would impose substantial costs on society, in terms of lost true confes­
sions, it is vitally important to know just how many false confessions 
will be avoided by the measures sought. 
Although the use of deception is not a risk-free procedure, the 
magnitude of the risk must be considered before new limits are im­
posed. There is no doubt that the conviction of an innocent person be­
cause of a false confession is a great miscarriage of justice and a matter 
of enormous concern. The research presented to date does not estab­
lish that false confessions occur with such frequency that drastic meas­
ures are warranted. Commentators have highlighted only a few dozen 
false confession cases out of the pool of thousands, if not millions, of 
cases in this century in which a person made a confession and was 
convicted.152 
b. Statistically Valid Research on False Confessions Could Be 
Conducted. Commentators urging limits on interrogation techniques 
seem reluctant to conduct the kind of research necessary to justify 
these limits. For example, while presenting the false confession prob­
lem as significant, Professors Leo and Ofshe assert "that it is presently 
not possible to quantify the number and frequency of false confessions 
or the rate at which they lead to miscarriage of justice . . . .  "153 Al­
though they correctly concede that such research has not been con­
ducted, their assertion that such research is "impossible" is not 
sound.154 
They assert that there "are at least three reasons why at present it 
is not possible to devise an empirical study to measure, quantify or es­
timate with any reasonable degree of certainty the incidence of police­
induced false confessions or the number of wrongful convictions they 
cause."155 They explain, first, that "American police typically do not 
record interrogations in their entirety."156 This fact does not present an 
insurmountable barrier to researching the frequency of false confes­
sions. Currently, two states and many other individual municipalities 
videotape confessions.157 Moreover, a researcher could arrange to ob-
152. See Cassell, supra note 7, at 1127 ("Even looking solely to the last ten years [1987 
to 1997], police officers around the country interrogated approximately 23 million suspects 
for index crimes." (citing FBI statistics on the number of arrests and assuming approximately 
80% of arrestees are questioned)). � 
153. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1135. 
154. Other commentators have also asserted that it is "impossible" to measure how of­
ten false confessions occur. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 107, at 85. ("It is impossi­
ble to determine or even estimate the frequency with which people confess to crimes that 
they did not actually commit."). 
155. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1136. 
156. Id. at 1136. 
157. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994); see also William Geller, Police Videotaping of Suspect 
Interrogations and Confessions (Report to the National Institute of Justice, 1992) (reporting 
that thousands of police departments use videotaping at least some of the time). 
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serve a large sample of interrogations.158 These observed cases could 
then be tracked to determine if there is evidence that the confession 
was false and it resulted in a wrongful conviction. 
The second objection to researching the frequency of false confes­
sions is that "because no criminal justice agency keeps records or col­
lects statistics on the number or frequency of interrogations in 
America, no one knows how often suspects are interrogated or how 
often they confess, whether truthfully or falsely."159 Even assuming 
that no such total number of confessions for the nation is readily 
available, the absence of such a number does not impede the research. 
Random samples could be observed in several representative areas 
such as large urban, suburban, and rural police departments.160 
The third reason offered for the absence of research on the fre­
quency of false confessions is that "many cases of false confession are 
likely to go unreported and therefore unacknowledged and unno­
ticed" because "most confessors will be arrested, charged, prosecuted 
and/or convicted." 161 The fact of conviction is certainly strong evidence 
that the confession was not false. But if there is other evidence that, 
despite the conviction, the confession was false, it is the admittedly dif­
ficult job of the researcher to find that evidence.162 
158. In fact, Professor Leo has already relied on this approach by observing a sample, 
although not an entirely random one, of 182 cases in one jurisdiction. Professor Cassell un­
dertook a similar observational study. He, or his research colleague, observed 173 cases in 
Salt Lake City. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 101. 
159. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 137. 
160. In two studies that did not specifically look for false confessions, but that did ex­
amine samples of confession cases, the researchers did not report that any of the confessions 
were false. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 529 (discussing 
Professor Leo's study of 182 interrogations in the San Francisco Bay area, and Professor 
Cassell's study of 173 interrogations in Salt Lake City). 
A random sample survey of the actual number of confessions could be made an even 
more manageable project if only murder cases were examined. Limiting the research to 
murder cases makes sense because most of the anecdotal evidence on false confessions in­
volves homicide cases. See Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 140. 
161 .  Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1137. 
1 62. Professors Bedau and Radelet seem unwilling to acknowledge that better, more 
comprehensive research could be conducted and is necessary to support their argument 
about wrongful convictions. They claim that if their existing study "fails to convince the 
reader of the fallibility of human judgment then nothing will." Bedau & Radelet, supra note 
1 12, at 24 (quoting G. SCOTI, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 262 (1950)). Of 
course, no one doubted, even before their study, that some wrongful convictions do occur. 
The key question, and the one on which Professors Bedau and Radelet shed little light, is not 
whether they occur but how often they occur. 
Professors Bedau and Radelet argue that they have already undertaken "a sustained and 
systematic attempt to identify as many cases as possible" of wrongful convictions. Id. at 27. 
There is no doubt that quite a bit work went into their study. Yet the glaring flaw in their 
research is that they did not conduct any kind of random survey. They chose their 350 cases 
from the entire body of cases decided this century throughout the country. A far more useful 
study would concentrate on a much smaller time frame and geographic area and attempt to 
identify the total number of wrongful convictions in that time and place. This would allow 
researchers to have some reasonable estimate of the percentage of wrongful convictions. 
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2. The Cost of Limiting Deception 
The argument for broad limits on the use of deception should be 
evaluated only after considering the costs of imposing such limits. If 
such limits were imposed, true confessions would be lost either be­
cause officers complying with the restrictive limits would fail to elicit a 
confession, or because a confession would be suppressed if officers 
questioned a suspect in violation of the limits. Although the precise 
cost from losing true confessions cannot be specified, there is no doubt 
that it would be substantial. Given that there is no proof of an unac­
ceptably high rate or number of false confessions, there is no basis for 
imposing on society the large cost of lost true confessions in order to 
avoid the much smaller cost of false confessions. 
The loss of true confessions, which translates into lost convictions, 
imposes substantial costs on both existing and potential victims. Un­
convicted criminals have the opportunity to commit additional crimes. 
In fact, a criminal who evades punishment for one crime is even more 
likely to commit additional crimes because he avoided being rehabili­
tated and did not experience any deterrence effect from conviction, 
sentencing, and incarceration. Moreover, in addition to the existing 
and future victims of crime, other innocent persons suffer from the 
loss of confessions and convictions when they are wrongly charged for 
crimes to which the actual wrongdoer has not confessed. 163 
There would be great costs imposed on the criminal justice system 
if improper deception were defined to include anything that tends "to 
decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confess­
ing."164 That is precisely what an interrogator must do if he expects to 
obtain a confession. A suspect who fully comprehends the conse­
quence of confessing will generally not give a full and truthful confes­
sion to an officer. If suspects were allowed fully to protect their self-
Thus far, Professors Leo and Ofshe, too, have demonstrated little interest in undertaking 
research on the actual number of false confessions. They have asserted that "it is far more 
important to study the conditions under which [false confessions] occur, the characteristics 
of such cases and why they led to deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice than it is 
to attempt to quantify" the number of false confessions. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, 
supra note 95, at 1139. They assert that it may not be "worth the effort and expense" to 
quantify the rate of false confessions because "there appears to be widespread agreement 
that false confessions and miscarriages of justice occur sufficiently often to warrant the con­
cern of legal scholars, jurists, and legislators." Id. 
163. See Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 109, at 498 ("[T]ruthful confessions 
protect the innocent by helping the criminal justice system separate a guilty suspect from the 
possibly innocent ones, while the failure to obtain a truthful confession creates a risk of mis­
take."); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1907 ("[G]uilty criminal defendants would benefit 
substantially if the law were to prohibit deceptive tactics, while innocents would probably be 
harmed by the impairment of the government's ability to sort cases."). 
164. Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 669 (citing FRED E. INBAU, ET AL., 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986)). See also supra note 9 for 
commentators who have urged a very broad definition of deception. 
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interest during interrogation, then much of what successful interroga­
tors practice, "from insincere politeness to overt trickery, would have 
to be disallowed." 165 As few suspects spontaneously give full and truth­
ful confessions, many confessions, and thus many convictions, would 
be lost if all deception were prohibited. 
3. The Value of Deception Outweighs Its Costs 
As shown above, no one has made a credible case that there is 
truly a substantial number of cases in which persons have been 
wrongly convicted based on false confessions induced by deceptive in­
terrogation techniques. On the other hand, the substantial value of de­
ception in obtaining confessions is based on long experience.166 Given 
the limited proof of the false confession problem, there is little ques­
tion that the benefit of deception outweighs its costs. Nevertheless, 
some commentators urge drastic limits on interrogation. 
There are at least three possible explanations why some commen­
tators urge drastic limits on deceptive interrogation techniques on the 
basis of such limited evidence of false confessions. First, some com­
mentators may believe that the few cases they discovered are some­
how only the tip of the iceberg. Second, and more likely, these com­
mentators may believe that even a very small number of cases of false 
confessions is too high a price to pay for the continued use of decep­
tion. In reaching this conclusion, these commentators either fail to ap­
preciate or substantially undervalue the costs that would be imposed 
on society by drastically limiting deception. Third, the commentators 
who focus on the few documented cases of innocent persons convicted 
because of police-induced false confessions may also be interested in 
reducing the far greater number of confessions obtained from guilty 
persons. The absence of a confession will sometimes mean that there 
will be no conviction or that the case will be so much weaker that the 
guilty defendant will be offered a plea bargain and allowed to serve 
less time. There is a range of reasons why some commentators may 
prefer to have even guilty persons either not be convicted or serve less 
time. For example, they may believe that criminal penalties are gener­
ally too harsh, that prisons are overcrowded and violent, or that many 
165. Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 670. Academic critics of deception tend to 
ignore or downplay the enormous value in permitting deception during interrogation. See 
Grano, Criminal Procedure, supra note 56, at 714 ("When commentators make reference to 
crime control, they usually use such narrow terms as 'the police interest' or 'law enforcement 
goals.' Unlike the discussion of perceived police abuse, in which passion abounds, the pass­
ing references to the possibility of uncaught murderers and rapists are flat. It is the police 
rather than the criminals who are treated as aliens." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caplan, 
supra note 58, at 1425 n.47 (1985))). 
166. That is why defendants routinely and strenuously object, in motions to suppress 
and at trial, to the use of deception during interrogation. 
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guilty defendants turned to crime as a consequence of an underprivi­
leged upbringing, drug or alcohol use, or after difficult life experi­
ences. But placing limits on the use of deception, and thus reducing 
the number of convictions of guilty persons, is not the appropriate 
means of addressing these other valid concerns about how best to treat 
persons who are convicted of a crime. 
4. No Reason to Single Out Deception Out from Other Causes of 
Wrongful Conviction 
The existing research has documented only a very small number of 
convictions caused by false confessions from police deception. Even if 
additional studies were to show more such cases, the very broad limi­
tations on interrogation would still not necessarily be warranted. In­
terrogation, like many other investigative tools in the criminal justice 
process, has the potential to result in some number of erroneous con­
victions. The argument has not been persuasively made, however, that 
interrogation should be singled out from other practices that also have 
the potential to cause erroneous convictions. 
False confessions appear to be one of the least common reasons 
for an erroneous conviction. In fact, there is virtually universal agree­
ment that misidentifications by victims and eyewitnesses cause far 
more erroneous convictions than do false confessions.167 Yet there are 
few limits on the ability of eyewitnesses to testify against a defendant. 
Procedures such as showups, lineups, and photo arrays all sometimes 
result in misidentifications and erroneous convictions. Although these 
procedures cannot be so suggestive as to make a identifications unreli­
able,168 the procedures that are permitted still result in some misidenti­
fications. These procedures are permitted, however, because they are 
167. Misidentification by witnesses was recognized as the "major source" of false con­
victions in Borchard's classic work. BORCHARD, supra note 9, at xiii; see also EDWARD 
CONNORS ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 24 (1996) (stating that eyewitness misidentification is the main 
reason for false convictions); Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 642 (1999) ("The major reasons [for false convictions], in order 
of importance, are inaccurate identifications, official misconduct, and ineffective defense 
counsel."); id. at 656 ("Erroneous identification evidence remains the single leading cause of 
false convictions."); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do 
We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1347 (noting studies showing 
that eyewitness misidentification is the primary source of false convictions); Gross, supra 
note 124, at 396 ("[A]s far as anyone can tell, eyewitness misidentification is by far the most 
frequent cause of erroneous convictions."). 
168. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 1 1 1-12 (1976) ("[T]he Court's concern with 
the problem of eyewitness identification" was the "driving force" behind United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 
388 U.S. 293 (1967)); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1973) (stating that courts 
must determine if an identification procedure is so suggestive that it raises "a very substan­
tial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"). 
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recognized as necessary if crimes are to be solved, and wrongdoers 
prosecuted. 
V. THE LIMITING PRINCIPLES BEYOND RELIABILITY ARE NARROW 
Although reliability is the primary basis for setting limits on inter­
rogation, there are additional reasons for setting some limits. But 
these additional reasons are few. Some of the additional reasons of­
fered by commentators simply collapse down to the reliability ration­
ale. For example, much of the objection to inappropriate "police 
methods" is best understood as an objection to methods with an unac­
ceptably high risk of causing a false confession.169 There may, however, 
be a small number of interrogation techniques that would violate due 
process without implicating reliability concerns. Professor Grano sug­
gested one such situation with a hypothetical concerning the use of a 
police officer who impersonates a chaplain to obtain a confession in 
the interrogation roomY0 Arguably, such a deception should be 
barred because it intrudes on society's fundamental value in religion.171 
The Court has suggested that a "shock the conscience" standard 
may be useful for determining when police deception during interro­
gation goes too far. The Court applied the shock the conscience stan­
dard when it considered police deception not towards a suspect, but 
towards the attorney for the suspect who was interrogated. In 1986, in 
Moran v. Burbine, the Court heard a claim that the police violated due 
process: 1 )  by failing to inform the defendant that an attorney, re­
tained by his sister, was trying to contact him; and, 2) by falsely telling 
the attorney that the suspect would not be questioned that day. The 
Court rejected the claim, finding that "egregious . . .  police deception 
might rise to a level of a due process violation,"172 but that the conduct 
in Moran "falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks sensi­
bilities of civilized society as to" violate due process.173 
Under a shock the conscience standard, techniques cannot be con­
sidered shocking simply because they are successful in convincing sus­
pects to give truthful confessions. The shock the conscience standard 
bars only those few techniques that, even though they do not involve 
169. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 
909-12 (1997). 
170. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 109; Grano, Selling the Idea, supra 
note 8, at 681. The hypothetical of an officer impersonating a priest was originally offered by 
Professor Kamisar to show that some police methods must be barred even if the resulting 
confession would be reliable. See Kamisar, supra note 54, at 747. 
171. Moreover, even if the particular jurisdiction does not provide a priest-penitent 
privilege, the suspect may believe that such a privilege exists. 
172. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986). 
173. Id. at 433-34. 
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the physical coercion clearly forbidden under the voluntariness test, 
and even though they do not implicate the concerns of the reliability 
rationale, nevertheless violate "canons fundamental to the 'traditions 
and conscience of our people.' "174 Although the hypothetical involv­
ing the imposter chaplain is not the only technique that shocks the 
conscience by violating a fundamental value, it is one of only a small 
group:11s 
VI. CONCLUSION: ADDITIONAL LIMITS ON DECEPTION 
ARE UNWARRANTED 
Interrogation techniques have changed little in the years since the 
Miranda Court itemized them, cast a disapproving look, but concluded 
that they were permissible as long as a valid waiver ·of rights was ob­
tained. The Dickerson Court affirmed the balance struck in Miranda, 
in which rights, warnings, and waivers protect suspects. But Miranda 
left (and Dickerson continues to leave) interrogators with a wide berth 
for obtaining truthful confessions. A compelling argument has not yet 
been made that drastic limits on the use of deceptive interrogation 
techniques are either required or advisable. The non-reliability ration­
ales for such limits - such as equality, trust, and dignity - largely re­
flect the inappropriate view that certain interrogation techniques 
should be barred because they are too effective in ·obtaining confes­
sions. In fact, there is nothing wrong with obtaining a truthful confes­
sion of wrongdoing from a guilty person. 
Reliability, however, is an appropriate concern. Interrogation 
techniques must be limited when they endanger reliability by creating 
a likelihood of producing a false confession. In advocating limits on 
deceptive techniques, however, some commentators have overstated 
the false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting inter­
rogation. The alarming claims of a widespread false confession prob­
lem have not yet been demonstrated with a statistically valid sample of 
confession cases. Thus far, the evidence of the false confession prob­
lem consists only of anecdotal reports. On the other hand, broad limits 
on deception could result in the loss of many thousands of confessions 
by guilty persons. Because there is insufficient proof of the scope of 
the false confession problem, the reliability rationale does not provide 
a basis, at least yet, for barring or greatly limiting deception during in­
terrogation. 
174. Moran, 475 U.S. at 432 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)). 
175. If barring an officer from impersonating a chaplain is appropriate, should an officer 
also be barred from impersonating a physician? Beyond clearly fundamental values such as 
religion, it is far less clear which interests are so important outside of the interrogation room 
that they should not be impinged on by interrogation techniques. 
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Moreover, even if researchers provide additional empirical proof 
on the false confession problem, alternatives to drastic prohibitions on 
interrogation techniques should be considered. For example, there is 
widespread agreement among commentators that interrogations 
should be videotaped. At least some of the concerns raised about false 
confessions could be addressed by the use of videotaping, rather than 
by strictly limiting interrogation techniques.176 
There is no question that deceptive interrogation techniques can 
contribute to the unpleasantness that suspects, both guilty and inno­
cent, endure during interrogation. Nevertheless, once there is prob­
able cause to suspect a person of a crime, some level of discomfort is 
considered acceptable because of society's interest in investigating and 
solving crimes. Deceptive but nonthreatening interrogation will gen­
erally be no more unpleasant than the other intrusions deemed rea­
sonable after a showing of probable cause - such as having one's 
home thoroughly searched pursuant to a warrant, or being placed in a 
detention facility during post-arrest processing.177 The probable cause 
standard provides an appropriate threshold of protection from both 
the pressures of custodial interrogation and the unpleasantness of de­
ceptive interrogation techniques. 
There is a growing view that reliability is the appropriate focus of 
the debate over the use of deceptive interrogation techniques. There 
should also be a greater acknowledgement that, before these tech­
niques are drastically limited, there must be statistically sound, empiri­
cal research to determine if there truly is a widespread problem with 
police-induced false confessions. In the meantime, we should let the 
police do their job of investigating crime, but we should also be alert 
to the possibility of that tragic case in which an innocent person has 
been wrongly convicted because of a police-induced false confession. 
176. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 494 ("The risk of harm caused by 
false confessions could be greatly reduced if police were required to video- or audio-record 
the entirety of their interrogations."). For additional support of videotaping, see Cassell, 
Social Costs, supra note 101, at 486-97; KAMISAR, supra note 31, at 132-36; Yale Kamisar, 
Foreword: Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 
236-43 (1977). Even when there is no videotape, defendants may be able to raise the false 
confession concern with the use of expert psychological witnesses. At this time, however, the 
false confession research is not sufficiently developed for witnesses on false confessions to 
qualify as experts under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
" [A)dmissions of expert testimony based on this new theory is premature" largely because 
"the empirical base that supports the theory has too many unanswered questions . . . .  " See 
James R. Agar, II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, 1999 Aug. 
Army Law 26, 42 (1999) (explaining that two federal appellate courts have admitted such 
evidence while the thirteen state courts that have ruled are divided on the issue). Scientific 
advances in DNA and other areas, however, do provide an additional measure of protection 
against wrongful convictions. 
177. See Caplan, supra note 58, at 1468 (comparing due process to the Fourth 
Amendment which was understood as forbidding only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy). 
